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Abstract
Are “self-inflicted” harms actionable? Courts increasingly have
allowed victims to identify other (typically unrelated) parties that may
share responsibility for such injuries. Moreover, insofar as judges now
also permit lawsuits against closely related parties, they arguably have
expanded what it means for a harm to qualify as self-inflicted. Taking
these various doctrinal developments to an illogical extreme, this Article
asks whether we should just let victims bring tort claims against
themselves, understanding that the victims’ own liability insurers
represent the intended targets. That this idea is not as crazy as it sounds
suggests the extent to which tort law has become unhinged.
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So take the photographs, and still frames in your mind
Hang it on a shelf in good health and good time
Tattoos of memories and dead skin on trial
For what it’s worth it was worth all the while.
—GREEN DAY, Good Riddance
(Time of Your Life) (1997)
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, an intermediate appellate court in Utah held that a negligent
driver could—acting as both the sole heir to and personal representative
for her deceased husband who had suffered fatal injuries in the accident
while a passenger in the vehicle—file a lawsuit against herself.1 I first
heard about Bagley v. Bagley from the nationally syndicated and
decidedly off-beat weekly “News of the Weird” feature carried by my
local newspaper.2 Several months later, the “Obiter Dicta” column in the
ABA Journal highlighted the decision.3 The following year, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed.4 Although this litigation drew its share of
ridicule in the popular press,5 it hardly defies explanation. In essence, the
Utah courts decided that persons can wear more than one hat when
participating in tort litigation.6
1. See Bagley v. Bagley, 344 P.3d 655, 660 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (reversing the trial
court’s dismissal of wrongful death and survival claims given the plain meaning of the pertinent
statutes), aff’d, 387 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2016).
2. See Chuck Shepherd, Lead Story—Newest Right, NEWS OF THE WEIRD, Mar. 1, 2015,
www.newsoftheweird.com/archive/nw150301.html; see also Pamela Manson, Utah Woman Can
Sue Herself over Fatal Car Accident, Ruling Says, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 18, 2015. A few months
earlier, a vaguely similar sort of claim had attracted some attention. See James Walsh, Worker
Files Repair Claim for Hitting Own Car, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Oct. 10, 2014, at 4B; see also Chuck
Shepherd,
Legal
Technicalities,
NEWS OF THE WEIRD,
Oct.
26,
2014,
www.newsoftheweird.com/archive/nw141026.html (ridiculing this claim).
3. See Brian Sullivan, Note to Self: You’re Gonna Pay, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2015, at 71 (“Who
knew that targeting oneself in a legal action could be such a clever strategy? If this catches on, it
could become a whole new category of litigation: a selfie.”).
4. See Bagley v. Bagley, 387 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2016).
5. See, e.g., Lamiat Sabin, Woman Suing Herself for Negligence over Her Own Driving
that Caused Death of Husband; Ms Bagley Has Taken Herself to Court to Act as Both Plaintiff
and Defendant, INDEPENDENT (U.K.) Online, Feb. 27, 2015 (calling it “a mind-boggling court
case”), available at 2015 WLNR 6014490; see also Pamela Manson, Should Utahn Be Allowed
to Sue Herself over Accident That Killed Her Husband?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 3, 2016.
6. See Bagley, 347 P.3d at 1007 (“Though the statutes require adverseness, that
requirement is met here because of the distinct legal capacities inhabited by Ms. Bagley. A
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In a broader sense, the Bagley decision also accurately portrays the
movement of tort law in this country. Instead of doing so in various
round-about ways, however, this Article asks (somewhat facetiously)
whether courts should more candidly allow injured persons to file
lawsuits against themselves. For instance, if Ms. Bagley properly had
standing to represent her husband’s estate (whether or not she was the
primary beneficiary), then would anything prevent this nominal plaintiff
from tacking on a loss of consortium claim in order to recover for her
emotional harm? And, if courts would allow such a derivative claim to
proceed, then why not a direct claim against herself for any physical
injuries or emotional distress as a foreseeable bystander to her husband’s
tortious injury? And, if such a direct claim might have merit, then why
not take her husband completely out of the picture and allow a claim for
any physical injuries that she may have suffered during her accident (in
other words, what happens if we strip away the procedural quirks that
accompany the contrived rights of action created by state statutes in the
event of wrongful death)? Lastly, insofar as such extensions would strike
courts as increasingly absurd, might they enjoy more traction if a larger
time interval separated the tortious conduct and the manifestation of an
injury?
This Article attempts to demonstrate that a non-frivolous basis exists
for affirmative answers to at least some of these questions. As Part I will
elaborate, existing approaches to seemingly unconnected problems in tort
law—ranging from the growing recognition of intrafamily negligence
claims, and the judicial hesitancy to bar the recoveries of victims who
acted irresponsibly or enforce waivers of liability, to allowing culpable
entrustees and trespassers to visit responsibility for their injuries on to
others—provide some support for the possibility of intrapersonal
liability. Part II first ventures outside of tort law to consider intertemporal
insights from other domains before circling back to address a variety of
practical obstacles. To the extent that this Article manages to construct a
plausible case for allowing lawsuits against oneself, it does so in hopes
different person acting as plaintiff and defendant is not necessary in this case.”). After agreeing
with the lower court’s construction of the applicable statutes, see id. at 1005–08, the supreme
court rejected the defendant’s argument that this lead to an absurd result, see id. at 1008–11; id.
at 1010 (“The legislature may well have reasoned that courts should allow an heir or personal
representative to sue him or herself for the benefit of creditors or [other] heirs when no other party
is willing to maintain suit.”). The court also dismissed the contention that such a reading would
offend public policy, see id. at 1012–14, concluding that these objections related to questions of
what if anything the negligent plaintiff ultimately might recover, which would get aired on
remand, rather than to her standing to litigate these claims in the first place, see id. at 1005, 1013–
14; see also id. at 1011 n.37 (finding little merit to concerns expressed in an amicus brief that
allowing such a lawsuit would create a concurrent conflict of interest and other difficulties for
defense counsel).
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of challenging tort law’s seemingly relentless preoccupation with
ensuring compensation of persons who have suffered injuries at the
expense of attention to more traditional goals of righting wrongs and
discouraging misconduct.
I. HALF STEPS TOWARD ALLOWING INTRAPERSONAL LIABILITY
Exactly forty years before Bagley, the Louisiana Supreme Court took
an even more extreme step than had the Utah courts in a factually similar
case before recognizing its misstep and reversing course on rehearing. In
Callais v. Allstate Insurance Co.,7 a car accident claimed the lives of
Lloyd and Carol Ann Guidry. Mrs. Guidry’s mother, Laura Callais,
brought wrongful death claims on behalf of her granddaughter—the
deceased couple’s only child—Roxanne, just an infant at the time of the
accident.8 Louisiana allowed the filing of a direct action against the
liability insurer for a policyholder’s covered accident, so Ms. Callais had
named Allstate as the sole defendant in the case.9
No real dispute arose in connection with the wrongful death claim for
Roxanne’s mother Carol as she was a passenger in the vehicle and had in
no way contributed to causing the accident. The lower courts, however,
dismissed the claim for the death involving Roxanne’s father Lloyd
because he had occupied the driver’s seat and the plaintiff conceded that
his negligence represented the sole cause of this single-vehicle accident.10
In a sense, it seems mildly astonishing that the plaintiff’s lawyer even
thought to try such a gambit, though presumably it would have offered a
far greater recovery in the event that Mr. Guidry had represented the sole
wage earner in this family.11 Even more remarkably, after the plaintiff
appealed the dismissal to the state’s highest court, a majority of the
justices initially sided with her position; the court read the broad language
of Louisiana’s wrongful death statute as not limited to deaths caused by
someone else’s tortious conduct.12

7. 334 So. 2d 692 (La. 1976) (on rehearing).
8. See id. at 693, 699.
9. See id. at 693–94; see also id. at 696 (“[W]here, as here, the survivor brings a direct
action against the insurer, no procedural bar would apply.”).
10. See id. at 694.
11. Cf. Callais v. Allstate Ins., 308 So. 2d 342, 345 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting the
insurer’s excessiveness objection to the $30,000 award for the wrongful death of Roxanne’s
mother), aff’d, 334 So. 2d at 701.
12. See Callais, 334 So. 2d at 694–97. The majority initially took the position that a
negligent decedent tortiously caused an injury to surviving beneficiaries entitled to assert a
wrongful death claim. See id. at 694 (“[A]bsent any procedural bar, a child should be able to
recover against his father’s succession for any damages he incurs when his father deprives him of
love, affection, support, and the like, by negligently killing himself.”).
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Two members of the court dissented. In a brief opinion, Justice
Marcus simply explained that the wrongful death statute “does not permit
the beneficiaries designated therein to recover damages whenever a death
occurs, but only when such a death is caused by the violation of a duty
owed to the decedent by another, not one that is caused, in whole or in
part, by the decedent’s own intentional or negligent act.”13 Justice
Summers offered a more pointed rebuttal to the majority’s analysis: “In
this case the child inherits the right to recover the damages to which her
father was entitled prior to his death. Obviously, he had no right to
recover from anyone, for he was the cause of his damage and injury. He
could not recover from himself.”14 Justice Summers also highlighted the
role of the insurer: “The effect is to convert an automobile liability policy
into life insurance, insuring the life of the named insured against his own
negligence and damage to himself in addition to insuring against claims
of third persons.”15 After a rehearing, the majority acknowledged and
corrected its evident mistake.16
13. Id. at 697, 698 (Marcus, J., dissenting). Denying such a claim in cases where the
decedent’s tortious behavior represented only a partial cause of the death reflected the state’s
position at the time that any contributory negligence by a victim served as a complete defense to
liability.
14. Id. at 698 (Summers, J., dissenting); see also id. (“Any right she has must be based upon
the wrongful death of her father. For his death to be wrongful the action of someone else is
necessary to constitute a delict, a wrong. The wrong must take place between persons juridically
strangers to each other.”); id. (“It is stretching logic and principles of statutory interpretation to
say that by reason of his unintentional negligence which brought about his own death he gave his
surviving child a cause of action for damages, for she was thereby deprived of his support.”).
15. Id. (prefacing this point by asking: “does the theory of this case apply only when there
is an insurance company involved?”). Lastly, he noted that every other jurisdiction viewed
contributory negligence by the decedent as extinguishing a wrongful death claim asserted by a
faultless beneficiary, see id. at 698–99, though a court would only have to take up such an
affirmative defense if another party had breached a duty of care running to the decedent.
16. See id. at 699 (majority opinion) (making reference to “convincing allegations that our
original decision was erroneous and would produce unfavorable consequences”); id. at 700 (“On
original hearing, we accepted [plaintiff’s] argument. We now think we erred.”); see also id. at 701
(holding that “a child may not recover damages for a parent’s death when the death resulted solely
from the deceased parent’s lack of care for his own safety”). Only one member of the court who
had joined the original majority opinion chose to register a dissent, though he did so without
penning a separate opinion. Id. (noting that Justice Dixon dissented). The one commentator to
give this decision close attention entirely misunderstood the holding after rehearing as denying
the claim because of the decedent’s contributory negligence. See H. Alston Johnson III, Death on
the Callais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 LA. L.
REV. 1, 12, 42–45 (1976); cf. id. at 46 (discussing still older Louisiana cases that vaguely resemble
the posture of Bagley from Utah). If he had been correct, then the court would have allowed a
claim like Roxanne’s (though reduced by half) after Louisiana replaced the contributory
negligence defense with comparative fault. See Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, Div. Erwin Indus., 462
So. 2d 166, 169–70 (La. 1985) (discussing a statute that took effect in 1980); see also infra notes
78–81, 183 and accompanying text (elaborating on the operation of this defense).
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This Part first elaborates on the growing availability of tort claims
between family members, particularly opportunities for children to sue
their parents, which may come closest to sanctioning intrapersonal
liability in those cases where courts have allowed claims against mothers
for prenatal injuries. Then it considers disparate other doctrinal
developments that also arguably move in the same direction: weakening
affirmative defenses based on the conduct or choices of victims that
previously had barred negligence claims against other responsible
parties; expanding negligence entrustment claims to allow irresponsible
entrustees to recover for their injuries; increasingly allowing trespassers
to assert negligence claims against landowners; and authorizing
shareholders to bring derivative claims on behalf of corporations for
mismanagement by corporate officers.
A. Growing Acceptance of Intrafamily Tort Lawsuits
Apart from its atypical procedural posture,17 the Bagley case from
Utah represented an otherwise unremarkable interspousal tort claim.18
More than a century ago, such lawsuits routinely foundered: given the
common law’s view that marriage created unity between husband and
wife,19 allowing an interspousal claim would illogically permit a person

17. The only other court to confront precisely such a lawsuit dismissed it. See Tanski v.
Tanski, 820 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Colo. App. 1991) (concluding that “the public policy of Colorado
prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages for a wrongful death he or she has negligently
caused”); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Curley, 585 A.2d 640, 644–45 (R.I. 1991) (answering
questions certified by a federal court in a case where a jury had awarded $250,000 after a man
died in a fire caused by his adult daughter’s negligent disposal of a cigarette in her home,
explaining that it would offend public policy to allow his estate such a recovery because the
defendant represented the sole heir); id. at 643 (“Curley was in all respects, absent name only,
both defendant and plaintiff. She is the only person with any financial interest in the jury award.
It was actually to her benefit to lose the wrongful death suit. Such a situation cannot be
tolerated.”).
18. See Bagley v. Bagley, 387 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2016) (making no remarks about the
interspousal liability aspect of the case); see also Asplin v. Amica Mut. Ins., 394 A.2d 1353, 1355
(R.I. 1978) (“[T]he defense of interspousal immunity is no longer available in an action based on
an interspousal tort where one or both spouses is dead.”); Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200,
202 (Va. 1971) (allowing an unrelated administrator of a deceased woman’s estate to pursue a
wrongful death claim against her husband for negligent driving); supra notes 9–11 and
accompanying text (explaining that the Louisiana courts in Callais affirmed the plaintiff’s
judgment for wrongful death of the negligent driver’s wife).
19. See Glanville L. Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MOD. L. REV. 16,
16–17 (1947); Jacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in
Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 485–88 (1997); see also Hoeper v. Tax
Comm’n, 284 U.S. 206, 219 (1931) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The [state tax] statutes are the
outcome of a thousand years of history. They must be viewed against the background of the earlier
rules that husband and wife are one . . . .”).
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to sue themselves.20 Even after state legislatures gradually disavowed this
position,21 courts often invoked various policy arguments to justify the
retention of interspousal immunity.22 With time, these rationales lost
much of their persuasive force as well, so that today most jurisdictions
allow spouses to assert tort claims against each other in at least some
circumstances.23 No one, however, thought to question the seemingly
self-evident proposition affiliated with the antiquated conception of
spousal unity—namely, the logical impossibility of lodging a lawsuit
against oneself. Nowadays, negligence claims brought by children
against their parents come closer to countenancing intrapersonal liability.

20. See Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 45 (Ariz. 1995) (“[A]t common law the courts
merged the identity of husband and wife; therefore, spousal immunity prohibited any action by a
wife against her husband because to do so would have been to sue herself.”); Ritter v. Ritter, 31
Pa. 396, 398 (1858) (calling this unity “one of the favourite maxims of the common law,” and
adding that “of course it excludes the possibility of a civil suit between them”); Davis v. Davis,
657 S.W.2d 753, 753 (Tenn. 1983) (“The formalistic legal foundations that originally lent support
to the doctrine of interspousal immunity have long ago crumbled away. . . . [I]ts early existence
can be traced to a concept that only imposed legal disability on the wife; that concept is unity.”);
see also C.G. Haglund, Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 GEO. L.J. 697, 704 (1939)
(referencing the “fiction of unity” and the “impossibility of the same person being both plaintiff
and defendant in the same suit”); William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1033 (1930) (noting “the procedural difficulty that the husband
would be both plaintiff and defendant”); Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23
GA. L. REV. 359, 363–72 (1989) (elaborating on this early history); id. at 385–86 (noting the
persistence of this notion: “[I]t is difficult today to appreciate the almost mystical authority that
the merger notion exerted over jurists during this [pre-WWI] period. Unity was a ‘metaphor of
enormous power’ and resilience that exercised ‘linguistic hegemony.’”); Elizabeth Katz, Note,
How Automobile Accidents Stalled the Development of Interspousal Liability, 94 VA. L. REV.
1213, 1220 (2008) (“Because husband and wife were considered one person under the law, it was
nonsensical for a wife to sue her husband as doing so would be equivalent to suing herself.”).
21. See Tobias, supra note 20, at 373–83 (discussing the impact of various Married
Women’s Property Acts passed at the state level during the nineteenth century).
22. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 616–19 (1910) (declining to construe
congressional passage of a Married Women’s Property Act for the District of Columbia as
abrogating interspousal tort immunity); see also Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 618, 621 (4th Cir.
1981) (canvassing the history of interspousal immunity in the course of declining to recognize
any such limitation under federal admiralty law); Tobias, supra note 20, at 383–98, 419–22; Katz,
supra note 20, at 1245–53 (explaining that growing concerns about insurance fraud troubled
courts during the period between the world wars).
23. See, e.g., Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1993); see also Bozman v.
Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 466 (Md. 2003) (counting 46 states as having “abrogated the doctrine,
either fully or partially”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 40 cmt. o (AM. LAW INST. 2012); Benjamin Shmueli, Tort Litigation Between Spouses:
Let’s Meet Somewhere in the Middle, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 214–17 (2010) (explaining
that the doctrinal landscape in this country remains uneven); Tobias, supra note 20, at 435–78
(evaluating at length the competing policy arguments and forecasting the eventual demise of all
remnants of this immunity).
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1. The Movement away from Parental Immunity
Although lawsuits by children against their parents never foundered
on the fiction of a unity (and the logical impossibility of suing oneself),
they presented some of the same policy concerns, including fears that the
parental defendant often might come to enjoy the spoils of litigation
nominally brought by their children.24 Parental immunity enjoyed
widespread recognition until the 1960s.25 To the extent that courts
presented with such tort claims increasingly have decided to abrogate this
limitation on liability,26 they may effectively allow lawsuits lodged
against oneself.
A 1995 decision of the Arizona Supreme Court is emblematic of this
tendency. In Broadbent v. Broadbent,27 a mother had run inside the
family’s home in order to answer the telephone, leaving her two-and-ahalf-year-old son Christopher beside their pool.28 The unattended toddler
nearly drowned, suffering serious brain damage from the sustained lack
of oxygen and lost all motor skills.29 Christopher’s father Phillip brought
a negligence claim on behalf of the child against his wife Laura, but
everyone understood that they thereby hoped to tap into the couple’s
liability insurance policy.30
The trial judge rejected the lawsuit on grounds of parental immunity,
but the state’s highest court reversed and remanded. After discussing the
birth of complete immunity late in the nineteenth century (and only in the
United States), the court explained that it would abandon newer precedent
that had limited claims to those cases where a parent’s act or omission
breached a duty owed broadly to any member of the community as
opposed to a duty that ran solely to their child.31 The opinion identified
24. See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 789 (Wash. 1905), overruled by Borst v. Borst,
251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952); see also William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5
VILL. L. REV. 521 (1961).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
26. See, e.g., Bentley v. Bentley, 172 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Ky. 2005); Butterworth v.
Butterworth, 154 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Tenn. 2005); see also Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney,
Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1161, 1164–
74 (1991) (surveying the landscape).
27. 907 P.2d 43 (Ariz. 1995).
28. Id. at 44.
29. Id.
30. Because their homeowner’s insurance policy had excluded coverage of intrafamily
suits, any judgment for the plaintiff would get paid by the Broadbents’ umbrella liability policy
issued by Northbrook Indemnity. See id. (explaining that this justified granting the insurer’s
motion to intervene on appeal as the real party in interest).
31. See id. at 45–48; id. at 49–50 (overruling Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800 (Ariz.
1981)). In contrast, and in common with several other jurisdictions, New York abides by such a
distinction, which means that it effectively retains partial immunity for parents. See Holodook v.
Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y. 1974).
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and rejected a series of arguments thought to favor retaining complete or
partial immunity,32 though it did so in a way that reflected a
preoccupation with the particular facts in the case before it rather than
assessing the broader policy ramifications in a categorical fashion.33
First, the Broadbent court doubted that allowing such claims would
threaten to disrupt family tranquility.34 In particular, it found such a
concern fanciful because the nominal defendant typically would have had
some say in the choice to initiate such a lawsuit.35 Insofar as it represents
a waivable defense,36 however, courts already could have entertained
such cases without having to abrogate the immunity. More importantly,
this assumption reflects a decidedly nostalgic view of the family, and it
starts to break down when considering non-traditional arrangements.37 In
cases of divorce, for instance, one parent might use the threat of a
32. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 48 (summarizing); see also Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort
Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533, 573–83 (2013) (same, in the
course of urging abrogation of immunity).
33. Cf. Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Store, 248 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2011) (“[T]he court’s
task in determining duty ‘is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably
foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally
whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of
harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed . . . .’” (quoting Ballard v. Uribe,
715 P.2d 624, 628 n.6 (Cal. 1986))); B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 275 P.3d 228, 234–36 (Utah 2012)
(same); W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 723 & n.278,
725 (2008).
34. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 48 (“The injury to the child, more than the lawsuit, disrupts
the family tranquility. In fact, if the child is not compensated for the tortious injury, then peace in
the family is even less likely.”).
35. See id. (“This fear of upsetting the family tranquility also seems unrealistic when we
consider how such a lawsuit is initiated. The parent most often makes the decision to sue himself,
and the parent is in effect prepared to say that he was negligent.”); see also Cates v. Cates, 619
N.E.2d 715, 727 (Ill. 1993) (“It is now generally recognized that the existence of liability
insurance eliminates the actual adversity of parent and child in negligence actions.”); id. at 730
(“[W]here insurance coverage does not exist, there is little motivation to sue.”).
36. See Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex. 1992). Of course, because a
liability insurer typically represents the real party in interest, such a defense would not get waived
except through inadvertence. Cf. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (Mass. 1975) (“The
parent is usually represented by counsel provided by the insurance company. Such counsel is ever
alert to protect the interests of the insurance company . . . .”).
37. In theory, moreover, a relative or friend might petition to serve as a guardian in order
to bring claims on behalf of a child against the parents’ wishes. See Eric T. Lanham, Suing Parents
in Tort for Child Abuse: A New Role for the Court Appointed Guardian Ad Litem?, 61 UMKC L.
REV. 101, 116–17 (1992). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c). Alternatively, a disgruntled
teenager might find his or her own lawyer for purposes of bringing a parental malpractice claim,
or a young adult could do so for a long-ago injury thanks to the tolling of statutes of limitation
during minority. Questions about picking appropriate parties can arise in public litigation as well.
See Lars Noah, When Constitutional Tailoring Demands the Impossible: Unrealistic Scrutiny of
Agencies?, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1462, 1478–81 (2017).
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negligence claim against the other parent in an attempt to wrest away
custody rights.38 In other situations, perhaps involving second marriages,
one spouse may have accumulated (and sought to protect) substantial
premarital assets and resist a lawsuit that attempts to access (and might
drain) these segregated funds.
Parents might unwittingly get drawn into litigation in another way.
The filing of a lawsuit on behalf of a child against a third-party tortfeasor
may prompt that defendant to try impleading the parent for contribution.39
Of course, the retention of immunity in such cases would not only allow
a tortious parent partially responsible for a child’s injury to escape
sharing the financial burden, putting aside the possibility that they had
liability insurance to pick up the tab, but it also indirectly rewards that
parent financially for their wrongdoing at the expense of the third-party
tortfeasor.40 In any event, insofar as the Arizona Supreme Court favorably
emphasized both parents’ participation in the decision to lodge a
negligence claim on behalf of their injured child, it understood this
category of intrafamily claims as amounting to allowable lawsuits against
one’s self broadly conceived.
38. See Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 781 So. 2d 1070, 1081 (Fla. 2001) (Wells, C.J., dissenting)
(“I am concerned that this decision will be used to foster litigation involving children in stances
[sic] in which the real battle is between the two parents.”); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595,
602–03 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting); see also Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 728 (dismissing
this fear); Irene Hansen Saba, Parental Immunity from Liability in Tort: Evolution of a Doctrine
in Tennessee, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 829, 852 n.120 (2006) (noting “the possibility of an action
brought on behalf of a minor by a custodial parent against a non-custodial parent (or vice versa)”);
id. at 899 (highlighting the fact that the three most recent decisions of the Tennessee Supreme
Court “involved a complainant bringing an action on behalf of their child against the child’s other
parent, from whom the complaining parent was divorced,” and adding that the vague standards
used in these cases “run the risk of becoming a feud between former spouses as to whether the act
was one of parental discretion”); cf. John Wisely, Vaccines Go on Trial Again in Oakland County
as Parents Fight in Divorce Court, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 13, 2017, at A17.
39. See, e.g., Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., 732 A.2d 767, 770–74 (Conn. 1999) (holding that
parental immunity barred impleader); Shoemake, 826 S.W.2d at 936–38 (holding that the owners
of an apartment building could not seek contribution from the mother of a child who drowned in
their pool); see also Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 344 (N.Y. 1974) (limiting parental
duty in part out of fear that the prospect of an impleader might discourage the parent in pursuing
a meritorious claim on behalf of his child against a stranger).
40. See Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 522 (1982) (“[T]he requirement that the third party [barred from seeking
contribution] pay the total damages means that the compensatory funds directly enrich the family
treasury of the wrongdoing parent, a result which violates the prohibition against a tortfeasor
benefitting from his wrong.”). This assumes, of course, that the claim would not otherwise have
failed on proximate cause grounds. See O’Clair v. Dumelle, 735 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (rejecting a claim against a homeowner brought on behalf of a child who had drowned
because the mother’s failure to supervise was deemed to be so unforeseeable that it amounted to
the superseding cause of the death), aff’d mem., 919 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Second, the Broadbent court discounted the risk of insurance fraud,
noting that this sort of thing can happen in any number of cases and that
other mechanisms exist to guard against collusion.41 The adversarial
process represents the primary mechanism for ferreting out such fraud,
however, and the skewed incentives to concede negligence in intrafamily
cases (at least in those sorts of families envisioned by the court) would
make it a good deal harder to ensure genuine adversariness.42 Indeed, if
one imagines a different sort of non-nuclear family, then a single parent
with sole custody (and acting on behalf of their injured child) might end
up filing a lawsuit naming themselves as the defendant.43 No matter who
initiates the litigation in the child’s name, and putting aside contractual
obligations to cooperate with one’s liability insurer,44 the nominal
41. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 48 (“The system can ferret out fraudulent and collusive
behavior in suits brought by children against their parents just as the system detects such behavior
in other contexts.”). Although Laura Broadbent had conceded negligence, her trial counsel
(supplied, of course, by their liability insurer) did move for summary judgment on grounds of
parental immunity. See id. at 44. Strangely, the supreme court later concluded that the previously
uncontested question of breach would still require resolution on remand. See id. at 50 (“In this
case, the trier of fact may find that the mother . . . did not act as a reasonable and prudent parent
would have in this situation. The finder of fact must determine whether leaving a two-and-a-halfyear-old child unattended next to a swimming pool is reasonable or prudent.”). Other jurisdictions
take the concern about insurance fraud more seriously. See, e.g., Renko v. McLean, 697 A.2d 468,
475 (Md. 1997), superseded by statute, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-806 (2001), as
recognized in Allstate Ins. v. Kim, 829 A.2d 611, 615 (Md. 2003); see also Verdier v. Verdier,
219 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Ark. 2005) (“Broadening the [automobile insurance] exception to the
parental-immunity doctrine to cases where a parent is covered by liability insurance through an
existing homeowner’s policy leads to a dangerous slippery slope.”); Squeglia v. Squeglia, 661
A.2d 1007, 1112 (Conn. 1995).
42. See Siruta v. Siruta, 348 P.3d 549, 555 (Kan. 2015) (“[T]he parties’ positions on
whether negligence should be found was ‘not entirely adversarial,’ as Duskin and Missy remained
married, and Missy went so far as to say that she did not want the jury to determine no fault [by
her for the wrongful death of her child].”); Hastings v. Hastings, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (N.J. 1960)
(“The decision for the child to sue will be determined within the family circle and obviously the
proposed defendant is going to participate in making it, quite an unorthodox situation under our
basic concept of adversary litigation, to say the least.”), overruled by France v. A.P.A. Transp.
Corp., 267 A.2d 490, 494 (N.J. 1970). If they had not consented to getting sued, see supra notes
37–39 and accompanying text, the parent presumably would have every reason to put up a real
fight.
43. See, e.g., Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 908, 912 (Miss. 1992) (allowing a claim
where daughter, “by and through her mother . . . , filed a complaint in which she alleged that her
mother’s negligent operation of a car” caused harm). Similarly, if the tortfeasor dies after injuring
his or her child, and the surviving spouse acts as the representative for the decedent’s estate, then
the now single parent may find him- or herself on both sides of the litigation. See, e.g., Karam v.
Allstate Ins., 436 N.E.2d 1014, 1015, 1019 (Ohio 1982) (retaining parental immunity given the
risk of collusion in a lawsuit having such a posture), overruled by Dorsey v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 457 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ohio 1984).
44. See Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (Kan. 1980); see also Bagley v.
Bagley, 387 P.3d 1000, 1007 (Utah 2016) (“[A] failure to cooperate with her insurer in mounting
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defendant in these cases cannot, of course, testify too favorably for the
victim without risking self-incrimination for child endangerment and
perhaps inviting prosecution.45
Third, the Broadbent court rejected fears that allowing claims against
parents would dissipate family resources (skimming support from any
siblings) because such lawsuits were unlikely absent insurance and asset
dissipation was more likely to occur if no one compensated for the
injury.46 Again, however, in the case of divorce, such a lawsuit may shift
assets from one household (and siblings or half-siblings) to another; even
without divorce, liability insurance coverage may not exist.47 Moreover,
the court seemed to view insurance as an essentially free pot of money,
failing to appreciate that someone—namely, other policyholders—
ultimately would have to foot the bill through increased premiums.48 It
also disregarded the fact that first-party insurance typically offers more
efficient loss spreading insofar as these forms of coverage avoid the steep
transaction costs associated with fixing liability through tort litigation.49
a defense would breach the insurance agreement and absolve her insurer of any obligation to pay
insurance money as damages in this suit.”); Nicholas J. Giles, Comment, Rethinking the
Cooperation Clause in Standard Liability Insurance Contracts, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 585 (2013).
45. Cf. State v. Massey, 715 N.E.2d 235, 238–39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting a child
neglect prosecution where a toddler nearly drowned after her mother briefly left her unattended
in a bathtub). See generally David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the “Free Range Kid”:
Is Overprotective Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947, 967–99.
46. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 48 (“If a child has been seriously injured and needs
expensive medical care, then a successful lawsuit against the parent and subsequent recovery from
the insurance company could ease the financial burden on the family.”); cf. Shmueli, supra note
23, at 231–32 (regarding interspousal negligence claims designed to access money from a liability
insurer as among the most clearly acceptable); Tobias, supra note 20, at 471 (“[J]udges who
subscribe to the compensation rationale [for abrogating interspousal immunity] on the basis of the
prevalence of insurance give credence to the fraud contention.”).
47. Some courts finessed this concern by allowing the claims only up to any coverage limits.
See, e.g., Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1982); see also Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 781 So.
2d 1070, 1077–79 (Fla. 2001) (declining to apply this limitation in a case of sexual abuse); Allstate
Ins. v. Kim, 829 A.2d 611, 615–16 (Md. 2003) (applying legislation that made immunity
inapplicable in automobile cases only up to the minimum insurance-coverage limits).
48. Cf. Horace Mann Ins. v. Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947, 956 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (“Any other
result [than applying the coverage exclusion for intentional torts] subsidizes the episodes of child
sexual abuse of which its victims complain, at the ultimate expense of other insureds to whom the
added costs of indemnifying child molesters will be passed.”); Carolyn L. Mueller, Comment,
Ohio Homeowners Beware: Your Homeowner’s Insurance Premium May Be Subsidizing Child
Sexual Abuse, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 341, 378 (1994) (“The cost of homeowner’s insurance
would increase if companies are required to defend and indemnify child sexual abusers.”). See
generally Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance
Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005).
49. See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629,
1653 (1994) (“[I]nsureds would be better off if everyone took the money spent to overinsure
liability and invested it in first-party health, life, or disability insurance.”); see also Deborah R.
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Fourth, the Broadbent court dismissed objections that parental
defendants would enjoy a windfall as beneficiaries of their children’s
estates, thinking that this “remote” chance should not provide a basis for
rejecting legitimate claims for compensation and that it represented a
matter better handled by modifications in the rules of intestate
succession.50 Nonetheless, this would represent the only real context
where tortfeasors might enjoy the insurance proceeds of their wrongful
conduct, and the court never suggested that—in the event a victim died
from his or her injuries immediately (which almost happened in this
tragic case) or at some other point before trial—it would have barred a
survival or wrongful death action based on allegations of parental
negligence.51
Fifth, while it conceded that this represented the strongest rationale
for retaining immunity, the Broadbent court did not believe that allowing
such claims would interfere with the exercise of parental discretion.52 The
court already allowed intentional tort claims and criminal prosecution in
extreme cases of parents disciplining their children, and it feared the
difficulty of distinguishing cases that involved the exercise of such
Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice’s Research, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 492 (1987) (finding that plaintiffs receive approximately 50% of the monies
expended in tort litigation). Then again, first-party insurers would not cover pain and suffering,
emotional distress, or other intangible losses allowed in wrongful death claims, but those types of
harms also would in no sense otherwise threaten to drain a family’s savings.
50. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 48–49.
51. When contributory negligence operated as a complete defense, wrongful death lawsuits
against third parties typically failed if the tortious conduct of plaintiff-beneficiaries played a role
in causing the injury. See Hall v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 224, 226–27 (D.S.C. 1974); see also
DeLozier v. Smith, 524 P.2d 970, 973–74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (doing so where surviving spouse
was deemed partly at fault in wife’s death); cf. Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 474 n.15
(Cal. 1970) (“When the negligent spouse dies in the accident and thus will in no way benefit from
any recovery received with respect to the child’s injuries, however, no logical basis can support
the application of the ‘imputed contributory negligence’ rule to a wrongful death action
maintained by the surviving non-negligent spouse . . . .”). Retaining parental immunity could,
however, magnify this problem in certain cases. See Hollister, supra note 40, at 522 (“The ultimate
injustice occurs when a negligently supervised child is killed by a third party [barred from
impleading the immune parent for contribution]. In that case, a wrongful death recovery would
go directly to the parents whose carelessness contributed to the child’s death.”). Other courts that
have abrogated parental immunity in whole or in part allow survival or wrongful death actions.
See, e.g., Hartman ex rel. Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852, 858 (Mo. 1991); Carver v.
Carver, 314 S.E.2d 739, 742, 746 (N.C. 1984) (though only allowing damages suffered by the
non-negligent parent because of the child’s death); see also infra notes 62–67 and accompanying
text (discussing a recent decision from Kansas); cf. Newman v. Cole, 872 So. 2d 138, 145–46
(Ala. 2003) (per curiam) (declining to abrogate immunity except when an intentional tort causes
death).
52. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 49 (“Parents do not possess unfettered discretion in raising
their children.”).
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discretion.53 The court concluded that parents owed their children a
general duty of care to act as a reasonable parent would under the
circumstances, though it hastened to add that trial judges should continue
to feel free to dismiss plainly frivolous claims.54 In contrast, recognizing,
as have other courts, the often wide-ranging and fiercely debated
approaches to parenting in this country,55 a concurring opinion favored a
more forgiving standard applicable to the exercise of parental discretion
that would impose liability only when a choice was “palpably
unreasonable.”56
Apart from disparaging the arguments commonly raised against
recognizing this duty, the Broadbent court never offered anything apart
from compensation in favor of doing so.57 Presumably adequate

53. See id. at 49–50. Although not mentioned by the court, another retort along the same
lines would point out that negligent supervision claims against parents generally remain available
when a child injures a third party notwithstanding the fact that it also invites courts to scrutinize
the exercise of parental discretion. See, e.g., Nolechek v. Gesuale, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1272–74
(N.Y. 1978); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 41(b)(1) & cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2012); Valerie D. Barton, Comment, Reconciling the
Burden: Parental Liability for the Tortious Acts of Minors, 51 EMORY L.J. 877 (2002). But cf.
Buono v. Scalia, 843 A.2d 1120, 1126–28 (N.J. 2004) (declining to impose such a duty); Porter,
supra note 32, at 558–64 (explaining that such claims routinely fail because courts conclude that
parents lacked either knowledge of a child’s dangerous propensities or the opportunity to exercise
control).
54. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 50 (“Children are certainly accident prone, . . . and trial
courts should feel free to dismiss frivolous cases on the ground that the parent has acted as a
reasonable and prudent parent in a similar situation would.”). This caveat suggests that the court
harbored some misgivings about its decision.
55. See, e.g., Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y. 1974) (“Considering the
different economic, educational, cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds which must
prevail, . . . parents have always had the right to determine how much independence, supervision
and control a child should have, and to best judge the character and extent of development of their
child.” (quoting lower court’s opinion)); see also Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting,
44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1266–69 (2011) (elaborating on cultural and ethnic differences). On
occasion, the “parenting wars” flare up and attract media attention. See, e.g., Jane E. Brody,
Giving Children Roots, and Wings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2015, at D7; Donna St. George & Brigid
Schulte, No Shortage of Opinions on “Free-Range” Parents, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2015, at B1;
Clemens Wergin, Op-ed., The Case for Free-Range Parenting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2015, at
A29; see also Donna St. George, Neglect Cases Encroach on Parental Role, Report Says, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 2015, at B1.
56. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 51 (Feldman, C.J., concurring) (“Thus, the parent who
decides to enroll a two-year-old child in swimming lessons at a neighborhood pool operates within
the [somewhat more insulated] realm of parent-child decision-making.”).
57. For an earlier commentator recognizing (and praising) the almost exclusively
compensatory focus of older decisions allowing tort lawsuits between family members, see Gerald
G. Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion Clause, 60
IOWA L. REV. 239, 248–53, 259–60 (1974).
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incentives for taking care already exist,58 which helps respond to the
court’s concern about a seemingly paradoxical distinction in the duties
owed to your own child and to someone else’s child.59 Along similar
lines, the insurable-interest doctrine allows a person to take out a life
insurance policy on her own child but not on someone else’s child.60
Indeed, the lack of any need to encourage loss avoidance in this context
may suggest still another argument against recognizing such a duty: doing
so could create a perverse incentive to harm one’s kids. News stories
occasionally describe parents who pretend that their children suffer from
a serious disease, in some instances even subjecting them to deprivations
in an effort to facilitate the ruse, all in an effort to get charitable
contributions.61 The prospect of a sizeable award from the parent’s
58. Cf. Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Minn. 1969) (offering as “[t]he favored
rationale for abrogating any one of the family immunities . . . the social gain of providing tangible
financial protection for those whom an insured wrongdoer ordinarily has the most natural motive
to protect”); Jennifer Tiller, Recent Development, Easing Lead Paint Laws: A Step in the Wrong
Direction, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 275 (1994) (“No valid deterrence rationale exists for
allowing these [parental contribution] claims because parents already have an incentive to prevent
their children from being poisoned by lead.”).
59. See Broadbent, 907 P.2d at 50 (“We fail to see why parents should not be held liable
for negligence in failing to supervise their own children near the pool, when their liability would
be clear had the children not been their own.”). To be sure, rampant child abuse and neglect
demonstrate that some parents fail miserably in their role as caretakers, see, e.g., Karen Kaplan,
Child Abuse, by the Numbers; A Study Finds 1 in 8 U.S. Kids Will Become a Victim of Serious
Mistreatment, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2014, at A12, but it seems entirely unlikely that adding the
prospect of tort liability will incentivize these parents to try harder.
60. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876) (“A man cannot take out
insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not so connected with him as to
make the continuance of the life a matter of some real interest to him.”); Peter Nash Swisher,
Wagering on the Lives of Strangers: The Insurable Interest Requirement in the Life Insurance
Secondary Market, 50 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 703, 710 (2015) (explaining that “today—
by case law, statutory law, or both—an insurable interest at the inception of a life insurance
contract appears to be required in every state”); id. at 715 (“[T]his ‘love and affection’ insurable
interest [recognized between spouses] applies with equal force to a parent and child
relationship.”); see also Jacob Loshina, Note, Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody: A Case Against
the Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474 (2007) (critiquing the doctrine). In one
tragic drowning case, the decedent’s mother brought a wrongful death claim against the child’s
step-father whom she later divorced. See Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497, 498 (Wash. 2008).
The defendant in that tort case ultimately got convicted of murder. See Jennifer Sullivan,
Stepfather Guilty in Drowning: 3-Year-Old Died While Mother Away, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 29,
2010, at B3 (reporting that he had drowned his step-daughter shortly after taking out a life
insurance policy on her); see also Editorial, Too Many Children Are Killed for Insurance, WASH.
POST, May 15, 2017, at A16 (referencing this incident among others).
61. See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Abuse Charge Filed Against Father Who Claimed His Son
Had Cystic Fibrosis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at B5; Mom Faked Son’s Illness, TORONTO SUN,
Dec. 22, 2017, at A26; Ohio Mother Allegedly Faked Son’s Cancer, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 13, 2013,
at A2. See generally Maxine Eichner, Bad Medicine: Parents, the State, and the Charge of
“Medical Child Abuse,” 50 UC DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2016).
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liability insurer may prove to be just too tempting for some. In short, the
opinion in Broadbent offers a snapshot of what can happen when courts
become excessively preoccupied with ensuring compensation for
undoubted victims.
Twenty years after Broadbent, the Supreme Court of Kansas
confronted an even starker intrafamily claim. In Siruta v. Siruta,62 the
father of a child who died in a single-vehicle rollover accident brought a
wrongful death claim against his wife for negligently falling asleep
behind the wheel during a family road trip.63 In a cross-appeal from the
trial judge’s denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
counsel supplied by their liability insurer argued that, because Mrs. Siruta
qualified as an heir to her son’s estate, allowing the tort action would
impermissibly make her both a plaintiff and the defendant.64 Although it
recognized the peculiar posture of the case,65 the court explained that the
mother would not necessarily recover anything as an heir.66 Technically,
and in contrast to the Utah case Bagley, she did not appear before the
court in a dual capacity,67 but that lost sight of the fact that these stillmarried parents presumably shared an economic unity so that the nominal
defendant effectively would get to share in the proceeds received by the
father.68

62. 348 P.3d 549 (Kan. 2015).
63. See id. at 554–55, 559.
64. See id. at 556.
65. See id. at 555 (noting that the defendant’s testimony at trial reflected a lack of
adversariness); id. at 554 (“Here a bereaved father sues his wife, the bereaved mother; the two
parties are the sole heirs at law of a decedent child; and, to add one more wrinkle, both parties are
potential tortfeasors.”). The court reversed the judgment that the trial judge had entered for the
defendant, based on a finding by the jury of 50% negligence by the plaintiff for falling asleep
while occupying the front passenger seat, because this provided no basis for invoking the
comparative-fault defense. See id. at 563–65.
66. See id. at 556–57 (explaining that, after an estate secures wrongful death damages, the
judge in a separate apportionment proceeding among the heirs could tailor an award based on the
defendant’s actions in causing her loss); id. at 557 (“Accordingly, we do not believe that [the
defendant] would necessarily receive, merely because of her status as an heir at law, any portion
of the damages she was ordered to pay as a defendant.”); see also id. at 570 (rejecting the
defendant’s efforts to invoke parental and spousal immunities); cf. Commercial Union Ins. v.
Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 681–82 (R.I. 1999) (allowing the decedent’s elderly parents to recover the
proceeds from a wrongful death lawsuit because her negligent husband could not do so).
67. See Siruta, 348 P.3d at 556 (“[W]e decline to view [the mother] as a ‘plaintiff’ in the
instant action such that she would necessarily recover damages from herself as the defendant. We
do not address what would have happened had [she] sought to join [her husband]’s action outright
as a party plaintiff . . . .”).
68. See Chamness v. Fairtrace, 511 N.E.2d 839, 841 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“To allow this
cause of action to proceed [for the stillbirth of their child] in spite of the defendant-beneficiary’s
negligence on the basis that the husband-father, as an innocent beneficiary, should be allowed to
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2. Extending Parental Liability to Prenatal Injuries
When parental negligence lawsuits allege prenatal injuries, the victim
and maternal tortfeasor shared a connection at the time of the wrongdoing
entirely unlike the fictional unity once thought to make spouses largely
indistinguishable from one another. In the nineteenth century, when
resolving tort claims brought against strangers for causing in utero
injuries, courts held that the biological unity during pregnancy barred any
separate claim for a later-born child.69 In the middle of the twentieth
century, courts began allowing such claims, though at first limited to
viable fetuses because they could have existed apart from the mother
from that juncture.70 Nonetheless, when contemporary lawsuits for in
utero injuries instead name the mother as the defendant, a few courts have
rejected these claims in part by reference to the biological unity of the
parties,71 while other courts have allowed such claims and do not appear
recover for pecuniary loss, even though defendant is barred from such recovery, ignores the reality
that any recovery will inure to defendant through the husband-wife relationship.”).
69. See Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 640 (Ill. 1900) (per curiam) (“[A] child
before birth is, in fact, a part of the mother, and is only severed from her at birth . . . . If the action
can be maintained, it necessarily follows that an infant may maintain an action against its own
mother for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the mother while pregnant with it.”),
overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417–18 (Ill. 1953); Dietrich v. Northampton, 138
Mass. 14, 16–17 (1884) (Holmes, J.) (declining to allow a wrongful death claim, noting that “the
unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury”), overruled by Torigian v.
Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Mass. 1967); see also Lars Noah, A Postmodernist
Take on the Human Embryo Research Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1136–38 & n.20 (2004)
(noting the common law’s earlier focus on “quickening” as well as the still-accepted view that an
unborn child does not qualify as a “person” for purposes of constitutional law); id. at 1139 (asking
in jest whether an embryo has “the same moral status as an inflamed appendix”).
70. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946) (rejecting the view that
a viable fetus was nothing more than a part of its mother). Subsequently, several courts allowed
claims for tortious injuries to a fetus even before it reached viability so long as it was later born
alive. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504–05 (N.J. 1960); Delgado v. Yandell, 468
S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. 1971); Kalafut v. Gruver, 389 S.E.2d 681, 683–85 (Va. 1990).
71. See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ill. 1988) (“Logic does not
demand that a pregnant woman be treated in a court of law as a stranger to her developing
fetus. . . . The relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus is unlike the relationship
between any other plaintiff and defendant.”); Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260, 263–67
(Mass. 2004); id. at 267 (“We conclude that there are inherent and important differences between
a fetus, in utero, and a child already born, that permits a bright line to be drawn around the zone
of potential tort liability of one who is still biologically joined to an injured plaintiff.”); Chenault
v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 475–76 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasizing “[t]he unique symbiotic
relationship between a mother and her unborn child” in the course of declining to impose a “duty
on a person biologically joined to the injured party”); id. at 476 (“Although the law wisely no
longer treats a fetus as only a part of the mother, the law would ignore the equally important
physical realities of pregnancy if it treated the fetus as an individual entirely separate from his
mother.”); id. at 476–78 (elaborating). In cases of in vitro fertilization (IVF), however, injurious
parental choices could occur before the implantation of an embryo results in any biological unity
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to worry about this unusual feature.72
Of course, the harm experienced in these prenatal-injury cases
typically does not manifest itself until after birth severs the biological
unity that previously had bound mother and her unborn child, and that
also represents the point where the primary victim would enjoy standing
to assert a claim.73 The old spousal immunity, however, had attached at
the time of the tortious act, even if a subsequent divorce would later have
given the ex-wife standing to sue.74 Thus, insofar as some courts allow
tort claims against mothers for prenatal injuries to their children, they
effectively have recognized in the victim an intertemporal distinction
between the time of exposure and the time of a lawsuit.
B. Conflating Victims and Culprits in Other Ways
Although the judiciary’s growing acceptance of negligence claims by
children against their parents comes close to allowing intrapersonal
liability, other doctrinal developments further buttress the idea that
with the mother. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 326 (2008)
(“[P]reimplantation decisions are being made in a space that exists, by definition, outside of the
woman’s body.”); cf. Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of
Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 633–46 & n.174 (2003) (discussing the
prospect for tort claims against fertility specialists, and explaining that efforts to implead the
parents likely would not limit medical malpractice recoveries).
72. See, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co. v. N. Tr. Bank of Fla., N.A., 807 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that a child could sue her mother for driving negligently while pregnant up
to the limits of her automobile liability insurance coverage); Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464, 466
(N.H. 1992) (plurality) (jaywalking while pregnant); Tesar v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 351, 361–
63 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (driving negligently while pregnant).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965). In the
event of a wrongful death action after a stillbirth, most courts continue to insist that the fetus have
reached the stage of viability at the time of tortious injury. See Jill D. Washburn Helbling, Note,
To Recover or Not to Recover: A State by State Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA.
L. REV. 363, 366 (1996) (noting that a few states allow such recoveries even for a nonviable fetus);
Douglas E. Rushton, Comment, The Tortious Loss of a Nonviable Fetus: A Miscarriage Leads to
a Miscarriage of Justice, 61 S.C. L. REV. 915, 920–23 (2010) (same); cf. Smith v. Borello, 804
A.2d 1151, 1158–63 (Md. 2002) (allowing the formerly pregnant woman to assert a claim for the
emotional distress triggered by the tortious loss of what amounts to one of her “body parts”).
74. See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664, 665 (Tenn. 1903) (recognizing parental
immunity, and citing by way of analogy a pair of decisions from other jurisdictions for the
proposition that “a wife could not, even after being divorced from her husband, maintain an action
against him for an assault committed upon her during coverture”), overruled by Broadwell v.
Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471, 477 (Tenn. 1994); cf. Furey v. Furey, 71 S.E.2d 191, 192 (Va. 1952)
(following “the rule of the common law that all liability for antenuptial torts is extinguished by
marriage”), overruled by Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Va. 1971). But cf. Windauer
v. O’Connor, 477 P.2d 561, 562–65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (allowing a claim by ex-wife against
former husband for shooting her while still married).
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someone could sue themselves in tort. Affirmative defenses of
contributory negligence and express assumption of risk no longer erect
insurmountable obstacles for blameworthy or consenting victims. After
contributory negligence as a complete defense largely became a relic of
history, negligent entrustment claims increasingly offer potential
recourse for irresponsible entrustees as well as innocent third parties, and
trespassers might enjoy expanded opportunities to assail landowners for
breaching duties of care owed even to uninvited entrants. Finally,
shareholder derivative lawsuits arguably countenance a form of
intrapersonal liability for corporate entities.
1. Softening Defenses Related to Victims’ Choices
Breaching a duty of care running to oneself generally gets recognized
as an aspect of the comparative negligence defense,75 though occasionally
these come into play when a bystander suffers an injury while attempting
to effectuate a rescue.76 In either of those situations, however, the actual
or potential victims get punished rather than rewarded for their tortious
behavior.77 As the old (generally complete) contributory negligence
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965); Ellen M. Bublick, Comparative
Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REV. 977, 984–88, 1029–34 (2003); Kenneth W. Simons, The
Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1747 (1995).
76. See, e.g., Talbert v. Talbert, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214–16 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (adult son
injured while preventing his father’s suicide attempt); see also Sears v. Morrison, 90 Cal. Rptr.
2d 528, 532–34 (Ct. App. 1999) (surveying the case law); id. at 530 (explaining that “the majority
of jurisdictions extend the rescue doctrine to first-party cases”). In a few bizarre recent cases,
primary wrongdoers have filed negligent infliction of emotional distress counterclaims by alleging
irresponsible behavior by the primary victim caused an accident that left the tortfeasor upset about
what had happened. See Jane Gerster, Lawsuit Against Dead Teen “Cruel”; More than $1 Million
Being Sought by Driver Who Struck and Killed Teen Riding His Bike, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 26,
2014, at GT2; Tracy McLaughlin, New Twist in “Twisted” Case; Lawyer: Driver Suing Family
over Fatal Crash Was Texting, TORONTO SUN, Jan. 9, 2017, at A7 (“Despite public outrage across
the nation, Simon has refused to drop her lawsuit, claiming $1.3 million for her own emotional
pain and suffering.”); Mitch Smith, Chicago Officer, Citing Emotional Trauma, Sues Estate of
Teenager He Fatally Shot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2016, at A10 (reporting that the attorney who filed
a $10 million counterclaim to a wrongful death lawsuit “acknowledged that it was rare for a police
officer to sue the estate of a person he killed” but alleged that the decedent’s threatening behavior
had caused his client severe distress); see also Simons, supra note 75, at 1734 (mentioning without
elaboration that “sometimes the plaintiff causes the defendant emotional harm by implicating her
in the injury”).
77. Cf. Bublick, supra note 75, at 1037 n.334 (“[A] provision [in an earlier draft of the Third
Restatement of Torts] seems to permit a plaintiff who negligently causes physical harm to herself
to sue herself. Although a plaintiff would not ordinarily be expected to sue herself for negligence,
such a possibility could come to fruition if the plaintiff had insurance that might cover such
suits . . . .”). It appears from the surrounding context that this commentator sought only to make
the semantic point that recognizing an obligation of self-care never technically operated as a
“duty” in tort because no one could have sued the plaintiff for breaching such an obligation, which
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defense has given way to the (generally only partial) comparative
negligence defense, courts have visited less of a punishment on
blameworthy victims. Nonetheless, this doctrinal modification does not
reward irresponsible victims; instead, at best they get to recover from the
primary wrongdoer only the latter’s share of responsibility for the injury.
The extent to which a victim’s irresponsible conduct may limit
recovery varies across the country.78 At the extremes, five jurisdictions
continue to treat any contributory negligence as a complete defense,79
while a dozen states have shifted to a “pure” or fully proportional form
of the comparative negligence defense.80 Most jurisdictions, however,
use a “modified” version of comparative negligence that also allows for
a proportional recovery but operates as a complete defense if the victim’s
assigned share exceeds a threshold relative to the share assigned to the
named defendant(s): typically, the former can be “no greater than” the
latter, but, in a dozen or so states, the former must be “less than” the
latter.81 All told, then, approximately two-thirds of jurisdictions in the
United States would allow plaintiffs to recover half of their damages in
cases where victims and tortfeasors get assigned equal shares of
responsibility.
means that recognizing categorical limits on such an obligation technically would not count as a
“no duty” rule. See id. (“In one circumstance the plaintiff might truly be said to have no duty. . . .
A rule that would prevent a plaintiff from suing herself for her own negligently created risks to
self would be, in earnest, a plaintiff no-duty rule.”); see also Simons, supra note 75, at 1738 n.109
(“[T]he plaintiff’s ‘duty to rescue himself, for the benefit of the defendant’ means the same
[forfeiture of some right of recovery], since plaintiff is hardly in the position to sue himself.”).
78. See generally VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (5th ed. 2010).
79. See, e.g., Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1156–58 (Md. 2013);
id. at 1158, 1169 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (counting Alabama, North Carolina, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia as the only other holdouts). Courts in such jurisdictions may, however, use
various ameliorative doctrines (e.g., last clear chance) that allow claims by irresponsible victims
to proceed. See David W. Robertson, Love and Fury: Recent Radical Revisions to the Law of
Comparative Fault, 59 LA. L. REV. 175, 188–89 (1998); see also Lars Noah, Civil Jury
Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1612–18, 1641–42 (2001) (discussing the judicial
willingness to let juries ignore their instructions).
80. See, e.g., Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 852–56 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding damage
award reduced by 97% to reflect comparative negligence under Illinois law); Sutton v. Piasecki
Trucking, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 481, 482 (N.Y. 1983) (99% reduction); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (favoring this version of
the defense). Courts in such jurisdictions may, however, bar claims by irresponsible victims on
other grounds. See, e.g., Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837–39 (1996) (treating
the extraordinary negligence of the plaintiff’s agent in an admiralty case as a superseding cause
instead of grounds for a partial comparative negligence defense); see also Paul T. Hayden,
Butterfield Rides Again: Plaintiff’s Negligence as Superseding or Sole Proximate Cause in
Systems of Pure Comparative Responsibility, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 887, 944–46 (2000) (defending
such decisions).
81. See Coleman, 69 A.3d at 1176 nn.20–21 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
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Whatever the form of this defense, principles of proximate causation
may entirely vitiate the consequences of a victim’s contributory
misconduct. In medical malpractice cases, courts routinely disregard
what brought the victim to see the physician, including plainly
irresponsible behaviors, because all patients deserve non-negligent
care.82 Of course, if we assume that the bad outcome arose after nonnegligent care, then the malpractice defendant has lost a powerful
mechanism for otherwise escaping frivolous litigation, which thereby
tends to reward the irresponsible victim upon settlement even if a jury or
reviewing court ultimately would have seen the injustice of awarding
damages. Separately, in medical malpractice as well as other types of tort
cases, post-injury but pre-trial suicide attempts may get charged to the
original tortfeasor.83
Express assumption of risk represents another affirmative defense that
has become somewhat harder to invoke. When enforced, exculpatory
agreements operate to release defendants from their liability for
negligence.84 Such waivers amount to consent by potential victims that
allows defendants to conduct themselves in ways that otherwise might
qualify as tortious. Insofar as judges increasingly permit injured parties
to disregard such hold-harmless agreements, they have decided to give
force to subsequent expressions of regret about earlier choices by

82. See, e.g., Harvey v. Mid-Coast Hosp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D. Me. 1999) (barring the
defendant from asserting a contributory negligence defense against a claim alleging substandard
care of an attempted suicide victim); Rowe v. Sisters of Pallotine Missionary Soc’y, 560 S.E.2d
491, 497 (W. Va. 2001); see also Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying
the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 390–91 (2005) (“Courts allow recovery for
medical malpractice that occurs during treatment of an injury—whether that injury was entirely
accidental, caused by another party’s negligence, or self-inflicted—without asking what
occasioned the patient’s visit to the health care professional.”).
83. See, e.g., Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 306–10 (Mo.
2011) (reversing summary judgment granted to an allegedly negligent surgeon on a wrongful
death claim where a patient committed suicide more than one year after a back operation left him
in unbearable pain); see also Maloney v. Badman, 938 A.2d 883, 886–91 (N.H. 2007) (explaining
that, subject to only a pair of narrow exceptions, courts usually treat suicide as a superseding
cause, and affirming summary judgment granted to a family physician notwithstanding his
allegedly negligent prescribing of narcotic analgesics and sedatives to a patient with Crohn’s
disease who later used the drugs to take her own life). When a suicide attempt succeeds and does
not get treated as breaking the chain of causation in a wrongful death action, the estate rather than
the original victim would enjoy the enhanced damages award. Cf. Bagley v. Bagley, 387 P.3d
1000, 1006–07 & n.15 (Utah 2016) (interpreting the state’s wrongful death and survival statutes
as not allowing the heirs to recover when the decedent’s actions represented the sole cause of
death).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
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potential victims to take their chances.85 Courts may refuse to enforce
waivers of liability for any number of reasons, and a few jurisdictions
view essentially all such agreements as offensive to public policy.86
For example, in Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp.,87 a closely
divided Connecticut Supreme Court refused to enforce a waiver of
liability secured by the operators of a snowtubing facility. 88 An adult
patron suffered a serious injury when his foot got stuck between his
snowtube and the bank of a run, and the plaintiff asserted a number of
negligent acts and omissions by the defendants. 89 After conceding that
the exculpatory agreement signed by the plaintiff lacked any ambiguity,90
the majority held that it offended public policy.91 It did so in part because
of a repeated concern that relieving facilities of an obligation to take
precautions would disappoint the reasonable expectations of patrons,92
which seems at least mildly perplexing in light of its earlier conclusion
that the waiver suffered from no ambiguity.

85. Cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory
of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 236–37 (1987) (“It is possible, consistent with this
theory, to acknowledge plaintiff’s regret and measure his preference by his current desires.
However, the purposes of tort liability . . . militate in favor of the foresight measure.”); id. at 278–
79 & n.237 (wondering whether such a hindsight approach to judging the victim’s risk preferences
would have a place in connection with claims founded on strict liability).
86. See, e.g., Dalury v. S–K–I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 797–800 (Vt. 1995); Hiett v. Lake
Barcroft Cmty. Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 896–97 (Va. 1992); see also Applbaum v. Golden Acres
Farm & Ranch, 333 F. Supp. 2d 31, 36–37 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying a state statute that voided
releases secured by recreational facilities); Coughlin v. T.M.H. Int’l Attractions, Inc., 895 F. Supp.
159, 161–62 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (explaining that Kentucky courts rarely enforce releases); cf.
Provoncha v. Vt. Motocross Ass’n, 974 A.2d 1261, 1265–67 (Vt. 2009) (distinguishing Dalury in
the course of enforcing a waiver for participation in a motocross race).
87. 885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005). The court split 4–3 on the public policy analysis.
88. See id. at 748 (reversing summary judgment granted to the defendants).
89. See id. at 736.
90. See id. at 739–41; id. at 740 (“[T]he agreement refers to the negligence of the defendants
three times and uses capital letters to emphasize the term ‘negligence.’”). Indeed, the plaintiff’s
deposition testimony revealed that he (as well as his twelve-year-old son) fully understood the
import of what he had signed. See id. at 741 n.6.
91. See id. at 741–48; id. at 745 n.9 (offering a concise summary of its seven reasons for
doing so).
92. See id. at 744 (“Given the virtually unrestricted access of the public to Powder Ridge, a
reasonable person would presume that the defendants were offering a recreational activity that the
whole family could enjoy safely.”); id. (“[T]he plaintiff voluntarily relinquished control to the
defendants with the reasonable expectation of an exciting, but reasonably safe, snowtubing
experience.”); id. at 746 n.10 (“[I]t was reasonable for the plaintiff to presume that the defendants,
who are in the business of supplying snowtubing services, provide the safest snowtubing
alternative.”).
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The majority in Hanks recognized that its decision represented a
distinctly minority position in this country.93 Nonetheless, it emphasized
that the facility served the general public, that patrons relied on the
choices of those operating the facility, and that the waiver amounted to a
contract of adhesion because patrons enjoyed no opportunity to bargain
over these terms.94 Even though the majority explained that it sought to
promote both the compensatory and deterrent purposes of tort law,95 it
seemed to emphasize the former when it expressed the fear that a contrary
holding would force health insurers and public assistance programs to
pick up the tab for injuries, which ultimately would mean spreading costs
to insured populations and taxpayers as opposed to the operators and
patrons of these facilities.96
The dissent in Hanks began by emphasizing the freedom of parties to
enter into contracts.97 Moreover, because purely recreational activities
differ from essential public services such as medical treatment and child
care, the dissent noted that customers opposed to signing a waiver could
simply decline to participate.98 It also questioned the majority’s view that,
like hospital patients, participants turn themselves over to those operating
or sponsoring a recreational activity.99 The dissent added that “the vast
majority” of jurisdictions have upheld waivers of liability in comparable
settings.100 Even so, courts in those states may decline to enforce

93. See id. at 747 (“We acknowledge that most states uphold adhesion contracts releasing
recreational operators from prospective liability for personal injuries caused by their own
negligent conduct.”).
94. See id. at 744–47.
95. See id. at 742.
96. See id. at 745 n.8. In effect, it preferred to force persons wanting to enjoy snowtubing
to purchase special insurance even if it duplicated first-party coverage that they already carried.
Cf. id. at 745 (“[I]t is illogical to permit snowtubers, and the public generally, to bear the costs of
risks that they have no ability or right to control.”). For an even more extreme expression of this
position, seemingly oblivious to the ready availability of first-party insurance, see Dalury v. S–
K–I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 799 (Vt. 1995) (“[Defendants] alone can insure against risks and
effectively spread the cost of insurance among their thousands of customers. Skiers, on the other
hand, . . . cannot insure against the ski area’s negligence.”).
97. See Hanks, 885 A.2d at 748 (Norcott, J., dissenting). In effect, it would honor private
ordering that departed from the default duties of tort law.
98. See id. at 751; id. at 754 (“Private, nonessential industries, while often very popular,
wield no indomitable influence over the public. The average person is capable of reading a release
agreement and deciding not to snowtube because of the risks that he or she is asked to assume.”).
99. See id. at 751–52; see also id. at 752 (“In fact, the attraction of snowtubing and other
recreational activities often is the lack of control associated with participating.”).
100. See id. at 752–53 (cataloging these decisions); id. at 754 (describing the majority’s
public policy analysis as “the distinct minority view”); see also McGrath v. SNH Dev., Inc., 969
A.2d 392, 396–99 (N.H. 2009) (enforcing a release secured by a ski resort against a snowboarder’s
negligence claim).
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exculpatory agreements for any number of other reasons, 101 and outside
of recreational contexts they may do so on public policy grounds as
well.102
2. Negligent Entrustment Claims by Ungrateful Entrustees
Theories of “negligent entrustment” have gravitated toward protecting
primary wrongdoers from their own unreasonable behavior. At their base,
such tort claims involve an owner transferring control over a dangerous
instrumentality to someone whom they know lacks the competence to use
it safely.103 For instance, a parent might face liability for loaning a car to
their unemancipated child if they knew that the child did not have the
skill to operate the vehicle safely.104 This recurring fact pattern hardly
exhausts the range of plausible claims: an entrustee may be a grown child,
a more distant relative, or entirely unrelated to the entrustor,105 and other
products may qualify as dangerous instrumentalities.106 Typically, a third
party suffered an injury and then could assert a tort claim against both the

101. See Robert H. Heidt, The Avid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-Protection: When
Exculpatory Clauses Should Be Enforced, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 381, 390–92 (2004); id. at 383
(“Currently too many courts refuse to enforce these exculpatory agreements, also known as
releases.”); Patricia C. Kussmann, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Agreement
Exempting Operator of Fitness or Health Club or Gym from Liability for Personal Injury or Death
of Patron, 61 A.L.R.6th 147, §§ 6, 9–10, 13, 15, 17 (2011 & Supp. 2017); Randy J. Sutton,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Agreement Exempting Operator of Amusement
Facility from Liability for Personal Injury or Death of Patron, 54 A.L.R.5th 513, §§ 4–5[a], 6[b]–
8 (1997 & Supp. 2017).
102. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 71, at 643 n.165 (“Courts generally refuse to enforce waivers
of liability in the health care context.”).
103. See, e.g., Stallings v. Werner Enter., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1207 (D. Kan. 2009);
Weaver v. Stewart, 151 A.3d 70, 75 (N.H. 2016); see also Douglass v. Hartford Ins., 602 F.2d
934, 936 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that such claims are “recognized in virtually every state”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 308, 390 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
104. See, e.g., Pierce v. Standow, 329 P.2d 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Hasegawa v. Day, 684
P.2d 936, 939 (Colo. App. 1983); McCart v. Muir, 641 P.2d 384, 387–88 (Kan. 1982); see also
Zugel v. Miller, 688 P.2d 310, 312–13 (Nev. 1984) (motorcycle); Honea v. Bradford, 251 S.E.2d
720, 722–23 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (motor bike).
105. See, e.g., Edwards v. Valentine, 926 So. 2d 315, 321 (Ala. 2005) (adult brother-in-law);
Tart v. Martin, 540 S.E.2d 332, 333 (N.C. 2000) (18-year-old son); Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Co.,
L.L.C., 306 P.3d 544, 548–50 (Okla. 2013) (employees); Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 106 (Vt.
1989) (grandnephew).
106. See, e.g., White v. Inbound Aviation, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 71, 77–78 (Ct. App. 1999) (small
aircraft rented to an inexperienced pilot); Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1208 (Fla.
1997) (rifle sold to a visibly intoxicated customer); Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 1098–100 (Kan.
1998) (powerful handgun allegedly given to 17-year-old son); Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d
759, 767–70 (Mich. 1977) (slingshot sold to child); West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d
545, 556 (Tenn. 2005) (gasoline sold to a visibly intoxicated driver).
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primary (though often judgment-proof) wrongdoer and the owner of the
dangerous instrumentality for entrusting it to the primary wrongdoer.
A handful of courts also have entertained so-called “first-party”
negligent entrustment claims: an injured entrustee seeks damages from
the entrustor.107 The entrustee, of course, typically acted negligently, and
the traditional contributory negligence defense would defeat any
recovery.108 With the advent of comparative fault as a partial defense,109
such lawsuits became plausible. Jurisdictions following modified
comparative negligence rules might continue to balk on the view that the
tortious victim shouldered at least as much of the blame as the owner of
the dangerous instrumentality.110 Nonetheless, in at least some cases, a
reasonable jury might assign less blame to the victim,111 and even that
would not matter in a jurisdiction following the pure form of the
defense.112
107. See, e.g., Herland v. Izatt, 345 P.3d 661, 671–72 (Utah 2015) (noting a division among
the courts that have considered the issue, and deciding to recognize such claims, though adding
that the modified comparative negligence defense will often serve to defeat liability); see also
Allstate Ins. v. Reliance Ins., 380 N.Y.S.2d 923, 930–32 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that a minor
could assert a negligent entrustment claim against her mother notwithstanding the state’s rejection
of a duty of parental supervision); cf. Rozewski v. Rozewski, 46 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (Sup. Ct.
1944) (allowing a widower to assert such a claim against his brother even though the plaintiff’s
negligent driving represented the primary cause of his wife’s death). See generally Ward Miller,
Annotation, Negligent Entrustment: Bailor’s Liability to Bailee Injured Through His Own
Negligence or Incompetence, 12 A.L.R.4th 1062 (1982 & Supp. 2017).
108. See, e.g., Perez v. G&W Chevrolet, Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289–90 (Ct. App. 1969);
Meachum v. Faw, 436 S.E.2d 141, 144–45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). Only very young or profoundly
impaired entrustees might have avoided the defense, see Frain v. State Farm Ins., 421 So. 2d 1169,
1173–74 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (involving a car entrusted to an institutionalized mental patient), but
minors engaging in adult activities such as operating a motor vehicle typically would get no
special dispensation, see Keller v. Kiedinger, 389 So. 2d 129, 131–33 (Ala. 1980).
109. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (discussing this development and the
various forms of the defense).
110. See, e.g., Lydia v. Horton, 583 S.E.2d 750, 752 (S.C. 2003) (“We cannot imagine how
one could be more than fifty percent negligent in loaning his car to an intoxicated adult who
subsequently injured himself.”); Herland v. Izatt, 345 P.3d 661, 665 (Utah 2015) (“[T]hose who
are inebriated and seek to sue another for injuries brought on by their own actions may find it
difficult to ultimately prevail in a negligence action, for to do so they must establish under Utah’s
comparative negligence framework that the negligence of the gun owner was greater than their
own.”).
111. See, e.g., Axelson v. Williamson, 324 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. 1982); see also Lyons
v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250, 1259–60 (Colo. 1989) (holding that a reasonable jury could apportion
less responsibility to an inebriated adult who died while driving than to the tavern that had
continued to serve him alcohol even after he became visibly intoxicated), superseded by statute,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12–47–801 (2014), as recognized in LLC v. Groh, 347 P.3d 606, 614 (Colo.
2015).
112. See, e.g., Blake v. Moore, 208 Cal. Rptr. 703, 708 (Ct. App. 1984); Gorday v. Faris,
523 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); King v Petefish, 541 N.E.2d 847, 852–53 (Ill.
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For instance, in 2012 an intermediate appellate court in Missouri
decided that a trial judge should not have dismissed a first-party negligent
entrustment claim.113 According to the allegations in this wrongful death
action, the four named defendants had allowed an adult employee to drive
their company van even though they knew of his serious drinking
problems.114 Scott Hays took the van, stopped at a bar where he became
intoxicated, and then on his way home died in a single-vehicle
accident.115 Preliminarily, the court explained that comparative fault
posed no obstacle to a first-party negligent entrustment claim because
Missouri had adopted the pure form of that defense.116 After reviewing
the available case law as well as the relevant commentary appearing in
the Second Restatement of Torts, it could discern no reason for allowing
only third parties to assert entrustment claims and remanded the case.117
App. Ct. 1989); Snyder v Bergeron, 501 So. 2d 291, 297–98 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the
trial judge should have awarded the estate of the entrustee 20% of wrongful death damages after
apportioning 80% blame to the victim); Stehlik v. Rhoads, 645 N.W.2d 889, 892, 894–96, 904
(Wis. 2002) (reversing a judgment in favor of an adult plaintiff injured after driving the
defendants’ ATV while drunk, where the jury had apportioned responsibility to the defendants
both for causing the accident and for the plaintiff’s failure to wear a helmet, and remanding for a
new trial).
113. See Hays v. Royer, 384 S.W.3d 330, 331, 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
114. See id. at 332; id. at 336 n.5 (noting that the complaint “alleges that Hays habitually
drove the company van while intoxicated”). The complaint had identified Hays as an employee
of the defendants—a pair of individuals and a pair of businesses that they owned—as well as a
“part owner” of one of the businesses named as a defendant, see id. at 332, which presumably
meant that he also enjoyed some sort of an ownership interest in the vehicle, but the court
concluded that this would not necessarily bar a negligent entrustment claim, see id. at 337–38.
115. See id. at 331–32. If the accident had injured innocent third parties, then they might
have had difficulty asserting a vicarious liability claim insofar as Mr. Hays did not appear to be
acting within the scope of his employment. Moreover, even in the event that his use of the van
had occurred while on the job (and putting aside the likely bar of workers’ compensation
exclusivity), his estate presumably could not use respondeat superior in order to impute the
decedent’s negligence to his employer (that would amount to suing yourself in the employment
context), which explains the need to assert a direct rather than a vicarious liability claim against
the employer. Cf. Armenta v. A.S. Horner, Inc., 356 P.3d 17, 21–26 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015)
(rejecting a workers’ compensation exclusivity defense, and allowing the estate of an employee
responsible for a fatal single-vehicle accident in a company car driven after work while intoxicated
to pursue a negligent entrustment claim against the employer).
116. See Hays, 384 S.W.3d at 336–37 (“[U]nder a pure comparative fault system (like
Missouri’s), a plaintiff will not be barred from recovery, even if his own negligence greatly
outweighed that of the defendant.”).
117. See id. at 333–36. The Missouri statute defining the liability of commercial
establishments that supply alcohol had, among other things, barred adult patrons from asserting
first-party claims, but the court did not understand this as expressing a broader public policy
applicable beyond “dram shop” cases. See id. at 337. For a comparable outcome in a factually
similar case, see Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 361–62 (Colo. 1992) (4–3 decision); id. at 363
(Rovira, J., dissenting) (“While the majority recognizes that voluntary intoxication is socially
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One year later, in Martell v. Driscoll,118 the Kansas Supreme Court
decided to allow first-party negligent entrustment claims notwithstanding
that state’s modified form of the comparative fault defense. The opinion
left some ambiguity about the relationship between the parties, though it
appears that the defendant had lent a car to his adult son.119 Leroy Driscoll
allegedly knew that Travis suffered from a drinking problem, had a
suspended license after multiple citations for DUI, and otherwise engaged
in reckless driving.120 While driving Leroy’s car, Travis Driscoll failed to
yield the right-of-way at an intersection and collided with another
vehicle, suffering serious injuries.121
In reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the first-party negligent
entrustment claim, the majority in Martell relied even more heavily than
had the Missouri court on the Second Restatement’s evident endorsement
of this theory.122 After reviewing the approaches used in other
jurisdictions, the court also concluded that the comparative negligence
defense in such cases would present a question of fact not amenable to
resolution on a motion to dismiss.123 Lastly, the court did not regard the
recognition of such claims as inconsistent with public policy.124

undesirable conduct, . . . it nevertheless rewards such conduct by permitting the person who drinks
to excess to recover money from another for injuries sustained while intoxicated.”); id. at 367–68
(explaining that the legislature had limited dram shop liability).
118. 302 P.3d 375 (Kan. 2013).
119. See id. at 378; id. at 387 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Alternatively (and assuming that the
shared last name was not simply coincidental), the defendant may have been the victim’s son,
brother, or uncle. Kim “Travis” Driscoll later died, so his estate (represented by Jerry Martell)
pressed the claim against Leroy Driscoll and related defendants; somewhat confusingly, the
majority opted to use the decedent’s last name whenever referring to the plaintiff while referring
to this defendant only by his first name. See id. at 378 (majority opinion).
120. See id.
121. See id. Although turning into traffic plainly represented negligence while driving, the
court made no mention of any allegation that Travis had consumed alcohol before his accident.
Cf. id. at 382 (“Though Driscoll failed to specifically identify in his petition what caused him not
to yield the right-of-way, it can be reasonably inferred from the facts in the petition that his failure
to yield resulted from his alleged general incompetence as a driver.”); id. at 389 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that a commercial vendor of alcohol would escape liability in this case
even if it had served Travis past the point of intoxication).
122. See id. at 380–82 (majority opinion).
123. See id. at 382–86. Indeed, notwithstanding the modified comparative fault rules used in
Kansas, which would allow a partial recovery for the plaintiff only if the victim shouldered less
than half of the blame, the majority suggested that a reasonable jury could find the entrustee less
blameworthy than the negligent entrustor on the facts alleged in this case—namely, simply
committing a traffic infraction compared with lending a car in spite of extensive knowledge of
the driver’s incompetence. See id. at 386. Perhaps the majority would have felt otherwise if Travis
had failed to yield because of another instance of DUI.
124. See id. at 386–87.
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Justice Lee Johnson dissented in Martell, accusing the majority of
“being an enabler for persons who blame others for their own
shortcomings.”125 “The fact that an adult is known to have frequently
exercised bad judgment in the past should not create a duty . . . to protect
that careless person from himself or herself.”126 The dissent also
highlighted the entrustees’ ingratitude:
Leroy should not be held to be [Travis] Driscoll’s insurer
just because Leroy tried to help Driscoll with the loan of a
car. By expanding the law of negligent entrustment, the
majority provides the mechanism to guarantee that no good
deed shall go unpunished and that no imprudent act shall go
unrewarded.127
Rhetorical flourishes aside, Justice Johnson saw profound differences
between third-party and first-party negligent entrustment claims, with the
former victims lacking the culpability of the latter.128 Finally, he drew
attention to a striking inconsistency, noting that the Kansas legislature
had rejected so-called “dram shop” liability, which meant that the
establishment supplying alcohol to the victim in this case owed no tort
duty, while the majority would visit liability on the more remote cause.129
125. Id. at 387 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The dissent wondered whether a defendant in such
a case would then have a right to seek indemnification from the successful plaintiff (or, worse yet,
his liability insurer?) insofar as the victim’s negligence triggered the judgment against the
defendant. See id. at 388; cf. id. at 389 (“Driscoll was the only person that could have completely
avoided the risk of this accident, because if Leroy had not loaned Driscoll a vehicle, Driscoll
might well have obtained one from another source and caused the accident anyway.”). The
indemnification objection assumes incorrectly that the injury had a single tortious cause (in effect,
that the defendant faces what amounts to vicarious liability); instead, negligent entrustment claims
routinely involve a pair of tortious actions proximately causing a single injury (unless the
incompetent entrustee gets held to a lower standard of care), which in the third-party variant
should result in some apportionment between the two wrongdoers, see Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d
557, 561–64 (Tenn. 2004) (citing decisions from Kansas and elsewhere), and in the first-party
variant should mean a substantially reduced award to reflect the plaintiff’s comparative fault.
126. Martell, 302 P.3d at 387 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“I believe that adults have to accept
sole responsibility for their own poor choices or careless conduct.”).
127. Id.; see also id. at 388 (understanding the plaintiff as arguing that the defendant “should
not have been kind enough to permit Driscoll to use the vehicle”).
128. See id. at 389 (“[A]s between the unknowing and innocent third party and the knowing
entrustor of the chattel, it is acceptable to impose a duty on that entrustor to protect the
public . . . . However, the superior knowledge and risk-avoidance rationales do not exist in the
first-party scenario.”). He also went to some lengths in distinguishing the one older precedent that
the majority had viewed as endorsing a first-party entrustment theory. See id. at 388–89.
129. See id. at 389 (“[T]he person who provided the reason for the accident is free from
liability, while the person who simply provided the instrumentality of the accident is liable all
around. That simply should not be, and the majority cannot avoid that silliness by blaming the
legislature.”). The dissent had nonetheless defended the recognition of third-party negligent
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As it happens, Kansas represented something of an outlier when it
comes to the liability of those serving alcohol to underage or already
inebriated guests. Although often limited to commercial establishments
and imposed pursuant to statutes that create a right of action, many
jurisdictions allow such lawsuits,130 which share certain similarities with
negligent entrustment claims. Typically, innocent third parties injured by
an intoxicated driver pursue dram shop liability actions, but some courts
also have allowed persons who got drunk and suffered an injury while
driving to bring such claims.131 No doubt the victims in these latter sorts
of cases need protection from their own poor choices, and imposing
liability on those facilitating the behavior may serve to protect
irresponsible drinkers from themselves, but it offers another illustration

entrustment claims, and first-party variants do not invariably involve voluntary intoxication. Other
courts have rejected such claims, at least when brought by a voluntarily intoxicated adult
entrustee, as against public policy even if not barred on grounds of comparative negligence. See
Bailey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 881 N.E.2d 996, 1003 & n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Anderson
v. Miller, 559 N.W.2d 29, 33–34 (Iowa 1997); Lydia v. Horton, 583 S.E.2d 750, 753–54 (S.C.
2003); see also Kayce H. McCall, Note, Lydia v. Horton: You No Longer Have to Protect Me
from Myself, 55 S.C. L. REV. 681, 694 (2004) (applauding the court for holding “that it is against
state public policy to allow a person to sue someone because the defendant did not protect the
person from himself”).
130. See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. 1987) (counting 41 states that
imposed dram shop liability as a matter of common law), superseded by statute, TEX. ALCOHOLIC
BEV. CODE ANN. § 2.03 (West 2003), as recognized in F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez,
237 S.W.3d 680, 684–85 (Tex. 2007); see also Richard Smith, Note, A Comparative Analysis of
Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 557–74 (2000);
cf. Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1993) (recognizing that only a couple of
jurisdictions extend liability to social hosts).
131. See, e.g., Farrington v. Houston’s, Inc., 750 F.2d 492, 493–94 (5th Cir. 1985); Nunez
v. Carrabba’s Italian Grill, Inc., 859 N.E.2d 801, 805 (Mass. 2007); Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d
350, 355–56 (Tex. 1993); Estate of Kelley v. Moguls, Inc., 632 A.2d 360, 363 (Vt. 1993); Bailey
v. Black, 394 S.E.2d 58, 61 (W. Va. 1990); see also Julia A. Harden, Comment, Dramshop
Liability: Should the Intoxicated Person Recover for His Own Injuries?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 227,
242–45 (1987) (arguing in favor of allowing such claims). But see Bertelmann v. Taas Assocs.,
735 P.2d 930, 933 (Haw. 1987) (“emphatically reject[ing] the contention that intoxicated liquor
consumers can seek recovery from the bar or tavern which sold them alcohol”); Tobias v. Sports
Club, Inc., 504 S.E.2d 318, 319–20 (S.C. 1998) (refusing to extend dram shop liability to
intoxicated patrons of lawful age who injured only themselves); see also Smith, supra note 130,
at 563–66 (explaining that legislative modifications have generally barred claims by or on behalf
of adult patrons). Minors who injure themselves after getting drunk have a better chance of success
in pursuing claims against suppliers. See, e.g., Marcum v. Bowden, 643 S.E.2d 85, 88–90 (S.C.
2007) (imposing a new duty on social hosts when they intentionally serve an underage guest,
noting that commercial vendors already faced liability when an underage patron injured
themselves or others); Hansen v. Friend, 824 P.2d 483, 485–87 (Wash. 1992).
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of the judiciary’s willingness to shunt at least partial responsibility for
self-inflicted harms on to more remote parties with deeper pockets.132
3. Landowner Duties to Protect Even Trespassers
The duties of landowners have evolved in comparable ways.133
Although many jurisdictions insist on retaining the traditional
distinctions based on the status of entrants on the land,134 a majority now
have dropped the line separating “invitees” and “licensees,”135 and a
handful of those would recognize comparable duties running to
trespassers as well.136 Some commentators have questioned extending a
duty of ordinary care to persons not lawfully on a landowner’s
property.137 Although the traditional rules may have led to unjust results
132. See Smith v. 10th Inning, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ohio 1990); Sewell, 858 S.W.2d
at 356–59 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, 896 P.2d 1245, 1249–50 (Wash.
1995); see also Sean A. O’Connor, Comment, Last Call: The South Carolina Supreme Court
Turns Out the Lights on First-Party Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Against Tavern Owners, 50 S.C.
L. REV. 1095, 1118–20 (1999); cf. Madeleine E. Kelly, Liquor Liability and Blame-Shifting
Defenses: Do They Mix?, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 223–34 (1986) (arguing that contributory
negligence defenses should play a reduced role in such cases).
133. See generally GLEN WEISSENBERGER & BARBARA B. MCFARLAND, THE LAW OF
PREMISES LIABILITY (4th ed. 2017); Robert S. Driscoll, Note, The Law of Premises Liability in
America: Its Past, Present, and Some Considerations for Its Future, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 881,
883–91 (2006); Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning
Landowner’s Liability upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 22
A.L.R.4th 294 (1983 & Supp. 2017).
134. See, e.g., Doe v. Jameson Inn, Inc., 56 So. 3d 549, 556 (Miss. 2011); Carter v. Kinney,
896 S.W.2d 926, 929–30 (Mo. 1995); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 330–341
(AM. LAW INST. 1965).
135. See, e.g., Koenig v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635, 638–40, 643–46 (Iowa 2009); Demag v.
Better Power Equip., Inc., 102 A.3d 1101, 1106–10 (Vt. 2014).
136. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 566–68 (Cal. 1968); Basso v. Miller, 352
N.E.2d 868, 871–72 (N.Y. 1976); see also Alexander v. Med. Assocs. Clinic, 646 N.W.2d 74, 78
(Iowa 2002) (“[P]resently six states use a negligence standard to govern trespasser liability;
twenty-nine states have declined the opportunity to change their rule in such cases; and two state
legislatures have reinstated the common law trespasser rule after it had been abolished by court
decision.”); id. at 79–80 (following the majority position that retains a lower standard of care for
trespassers). The “attractive nuisance” rule has long existed to extend special protections to
trespassing children under limited circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339
(AM. LAW INST. 1965); Evelyn Atkinson, Creating the Reasonable Child: Risk, Responsibility,
and the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1122 (2017); Driscoll, supra note
133, at 899–904; cf. Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274, 1277–78 (Okla. 1990) (declining to extend
the doctrine where a two-year-old nearly drowned in a pond while trespassing on a neighbor’s
farm land).
137. See Keith N. Hylton, Tort Duties of Landowners: A Positive Theory, 44 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1049, 1066–67 (2009) (arguing that the “cheapest-cost-avoider” rationale offers one
justification for this distinction); William L. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV.
427, 427–28 (1959) (“[W]hen an adult trespasses upon land which is not his own, . . . [h]e is a

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/4

30

Noah: “Go Sue Yourself!” Imagining Intrapersonal Liability for Negligen

2018]

IMAGINING INTRAPERSONAL LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENTLY SELF-INFLICTED HARMS

679

in the case of victims deemed trespassers in a seemingly trivial sense,138
the unitary duty imposed by more liberal jurisdictions also may result in
dubious outcomes.139
For example, in Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority,140 the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed a sizeable plaintiffs’ judgment in a wrongful
death case even though the decedent had trespassed on the defendant’s
property. Sang Yeul Lee, a 46-year-old man, had entered a right-of-way
owned by the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), evidently in order to
urinate after a night of heavy drinking, and he died upon making contact
with the electrified third rail.141 The jury awarded his estate $3 million in
damages, which the judge cut in half under the state’s pure comparative
wrongdoer, who has no great standing before the law, and no right to demand that he be provided
with a safe place in which to trespass.”); Driscoll, supra note 133, at 898 (“A landowner cannot
have a duty to someone who has no right. To say otherwise would be to give wrongdoers a veto
over the use of land by the owner and thus harm his right to own, possess, and use real property.”);
id. at 905 (“[T]he trespasser distinction was not only useful for feudal society . . . . [It] helps
maintain a healthy system of private property rights.”). But see Graham Hughes, Duties to
Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation [sic], 68 YALE L.J. 633, 648–49 (1959)
(critiquing the endorsement of this distinction in the First Restatement of Torts); id. at 686–704
(elaborating); id. at 691 (“An increase in the number of verdicts favoring trespassing plaintiffs
would necessitate only a very slight inflation of insurance premiums.”); id. at 704 (“Where
national insurance does not exist, private insurance must be incited to cover as wide a field as
possible.”).
138. See, e.g., Bennett v. Napolitano, 746 A.2d 138, 141–42 (R.I. 2000) (affirming summary
judgment against a plaintiff injured when a large tree branch fell while he walked his dogs in a
city park long after it had closed for the night). The latest Restatement would constrict landowner
duties only in the case of so-called “flagrant” trespassers. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 52 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); see also David A. Logan,
When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the “Flagrant Trespasser,” 37
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1468–80, 1483–84 (2011) (elaborating on this novel formulation
and the criticisms leveled against it); Ann Fievet, Comment, Breaking the Law and Getting Paid
for It: How the Third Restatement of Torts Synthesizes Two Distinct Standards of Care Owed to
Trespassers, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 246–48, 262 (2009) (defending this blended approach
for accurately capturing the typical outcomes under the seemingly varied standards applied by
different jurisdictions).
139. See Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 637 (N.H. 1976) (Grimes, J., dissenting) (“A
burglar who is injured while scaling a fence in a high-crime area where burglars are not
unexpected would be able to put the owner to the risk of a jury decision on the question if he had
used reasonable care toward the burglar.”); Don G. Campbell, Property Law May Add Insult to
Injury, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1985, § 5, at 12 (reporting, among other cases, that a burglar who fell
through a skylight settled his claim for nearly $500,000). Such concerns prompted the California
legislature to exclude certain criminal trespassers from the unitary standard. See Calvillo-Silva v.
Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 71–73, 80–82 (Cal. 1998) (applying this statute to a claim asserted
by someone seriously injured after trying to rob a convenience store, but concluding that the trial
judge erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants), abrogated by Aguilar v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 513 (Cal. 2001).
140. 605 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. 1992).
141. See id. at 497.
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fault defense—the decedent had failed to notice several warning signs
that the defendant had posted, which came as no surprise in light of the
fact that his blood–alcohol content registered over 0.34 (a level known as
“stupor”).142
Although the rules of premises liability in Illinois continued to
differentiate between adult trespassers and lawful entrants on land, and
the case came within none of the exceptions previously recognized in the
state, the court in Lee crafted an exception to protect adults foreseeably
trespassing in a place of great danger.143 It relied heavily on section 337
of the Second Restatement (“Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to
Known Trespassers”), which covered instances where the possessor “has
reason to know of their presence in dangerous proximity to the
condition.”144 As the first comment to this section made clear, however,
the rule contemplated situations where the landowner should have
realized that a particular trespasser faced imminent danger and needed to
get alerted.145 The court instead decided that CTA owed a duty to all
trespassers because it could “reasonably anticipate” that at some point
someone might make contact with the third rail—CTA actually knew of
occasional trespassers and similar injuries, and it could anticipate more

142. See id. For an arguably more sympathetic wrongful death claim involving an
electrocuted trespasser, see Mark v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 496 P.2d 1276, 1278–81 (Cal. 1972)
(reversing a directed verdict against such a claim after a college student, frustrated by the utility
company’s failure to repair a street lamp shining brightly just outside of his apartment bedroom
window, attempted to unscrew the bulb himself as his roommates had done previously while
unaware of the high voltage connection).
143. See Lee, 605 N.E.2d at 498–99. The court expressed support for the plaintiff’s argument
that it should entirely eliminate the separate treatment of trespassers, but it deferred to the
legislature’s judgment to retain this distinction. See id. at 499. The broad new exception that it
recognized may have rendered the distinction largely meaningless. Conversely, even in
jurisdictions that have adopted a unitary standard of care, genuinely unforeseeable trespassers will
remain largely unprotected. See, e.g., Winfrey v. GGP Ala Moana LLC, 308 P.3d 891, 901–03
(Haw. 2013) (affirming summary judgment for defendants on a wrongful death claim—where a
deranged young adult had accessed the rooftop of a shopping mall and crawled into an exhaust
duct—except insofar as they allegedly failed to get sources of heat and smoke in the food court
shut off promptly upon discovering her trapped in the ventilation system).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 337(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
145. See id. cmt. a (explaining that “a possessor of land is subject to liability to a trespasser
whom he knows to be about to come in contact with a highly dangerous artificial condition”). The
majority took comfort in the fact that the Arizona Supreme Court also had applied § 337 more
broadly than suggested by this comment, see Lee, 605 N.E.2d at 500–01, but the decision in that
case seemed better captured by an exception already recognized in Illinois for “frequent
trespassers.” See id. at 498–99; see also id. at 511–12 (Moran, J., dissenting). In Webster v.
Culbertson, 761 P.2d 1063 (Ariz. 1988), the landowner had erected a length of nearly invisible
barbed wire across a pathway regularly used by trespassers, and the court held that she could face
liability for failing to post any sort of a warning. See id. at 1064–65, 1067.
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given the proximity of the site to a public sidewalk.146 As one of the
dissenting opinions pointed out, however, the prior incidents hardly gave
the defendant reason to know that trespassers might encounter the third
rail at this site.147
Even if this broad exception makes some sense, its application to the
record in this case hardly inspired confidence. First, the majority
equivocated on the scope of this new-found duty: was it simply an
obligation to warn or might it also require landowners to adopt still more
cumbersome safeguards? Section 337 plainly only called for a warning,
and the court framed its holding in those terms, 148 but in other places it
suggested imposing a broader obligation to protect trespassers.149
Although the majority held that a reasonable jury could find an
inadequate warning on these facts,150 which seems at least mildly farfetched given the several different signs posted at the site (“Danger,”
146. See Lee, 605 N.E.2d at 500 (“[P]laintiff presented evidence at trial of 10 prior accidents
which occurred between 1948 and 1975 on the 3.2-mile segment of track where the CTA’s third
rail ran at grade level.”); id. at 501 (“[T]he third rail is located a mere 6½ feet from the public
sidewalk, which is adjacent to a busy city street. The CTA knew that pedestrians used the sidewalk
to cross the tracks, and . . . [it] was aware that such persons could possibly come into dangerous
proximity with the third rail.”); see also id. at 505–07 (rejecting objections to the admission of
evidence concerning these prior incidents).
147. See id. at 512 (Moran, J., dissenting) (“Although a youth had fallen onto the third rail
from a fence he was scaling at that location in 1974, there was no recorded incident of a pedestrian
ever previously contacting the third rail after leaving the sidewalk at the Kedzie/Ravenswood
crossing. I do not believe that the CTA’s knowledge of accidents taking place more than 15
months earlier and at other locations along the line is enough . . . .”); see also id. (explaining that
more than a year before this accident the CTA had “installed pointed boards on the ground to alert
trespassers to the fact that they were walking where they ought not to be”).
148. See id. at 501 (majority opinion) (“[W]e hold that the CTA owed plaintiff’s decedent a
duty of ordinary care to properly warn of the third rail.”).
149. See id. at 499 (explaining that the plaintiff urged it to recognize a landowner “duty of
ordinary care to protect and/or warn the trespasser”); id. at 502 (“[T]he risk of serious injury or
death to a pedestrian as a result of contact with a third rail located at grade level, in close proximity
to a sidewalk, outweighs any burdens associated with more formidable safeguards or, at the least,
adequate warning.”). Indeed, the majority rejected the CTA’s objections to the admissibility of a
plaintiff’s expert whose testimony had focused on steps other than warnings. See id. at 504–05
(discussing the use of overhead wires, gates, or cover boards). Moreover, in response to the CTA’s
objection that the trial judge should not have allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint before
closing argument to allege that the defendant had failed to adopt safeguards, the majority found
no prejudice because the evidence offered by both parties encompassed more than the adequacy
of the warnings and included a discussion of barriers. See id. at 508–09.
150. See id. at 501 (“There was nothing which indicated either the existence or the location
of the third rail, or that the electric current was carried in a rail. There were no markings on the
third rail itself.”); id. at 502 (“Of the five warning signs posted at the crossing, not one warning
indicated the presence of the third rail. Additionally, as we have previously stated, the third rail
was not marked, nor was there any indication that the electric current, of which the posted signs
warned, was carried in any of the grade-level rails.”).
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“Keep Out,” and “Electric Current”),151 its conclusion that this
inadequacy represented the cause of Mr. Lee’s death absolutely boggles
the mind.152 If, however, this newfangled duty to trespassers might
require taking additional steps such as fencing or replacing the electrified
rail with overhead wires, then the plaintiff would have little difficulty
proving causation.153 Thankfully, courts in other states that continue to
impose minimal landowner duties running to adult trespassers have
rejected absurd claims of this sort.154
151. See id. at 512 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see also Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn:
Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to Know” About Consumer Product Hazards,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 347–50, 361–74 (1994) (discussing considerations relevant to judging
the adequacy of warnings in products liability litigation and elsewhere).
152. Initially, the court suggested that Mr. Lee’s state of inebriation would not factor into the
causation inquiry. See Lee, 605 N.E.2d at 502 (“The decedent’s intoxication was properly a
consideration only with respect to his contributory negligence.”). Then it concluded that his
condition would not defeat causation, offering nothing more by way of analysis than the
following: “we cannot conclude that plaintiff’s decedent’s injuries would have occurred without
the CTA’s failure to adequately warn of the electric current in the rail. Significantly, plaintiff’s
decedent apparently had the presence of mind to seek the privacy and shelter of the surrounding
buildings at the crossing before relieving himself.” Id. at 503. As one of the dissenters put it:
“These signs were printed in English which the decedent could not read. With a 0.341
concentration of blood alcohol, however, it is questionable whether it would have mattered if the
signs had been printed in Korean or even in pictures. The decedent was virtually blind drunk.” Id.
at 512–13 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see also id. at 513 (“In addition to the signing, sharp triangular
shaped boards had been installed between the sidewalk and the third rail to make it extremely
difficult and awkward for a person to walk [more than six feet] up the tracks.”). Nonetheless,
Justice Heiple seemed willing to give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on causation; instead,
he questioned the jury’s decision to apportion 50% of the responsibility to the CTA (thinking that
10% made more sense) or assess $3 million as compensatory damages (thinking that $750,000
made more sense). See id. (suggesting that he might have affirmed an award of $75,000).
153. This assumes, of course, that the plaintiff could establish a breach given the far greater
costs of undertaking such measures. See id. at 512 (Moran, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority does
not weigh the cost to the CTA—and the public—of putting into place and maintaining other
safeguards. The CTA contends that measures such as swinging gates and catenary [i.e., overhead]
wires would impose a heavy financial burden, and that such measures have not proved effective
in protecting the public.”); cf. Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93–94 (N.Y. 1919) (reversing
judgment for a plaintiff electrocuted by overhead trolley wires because this risk was too remote
and it would have been impossible to bury the wires).
154. See, e.g., Rotter v. Union Pac. R.R., 4 F. Supp. 2d 872, 874–75 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(granting summary judgment against a negligence claim asserted by an inebriated adult hit by a
train in the defendant’s switching yard during the middle of the night); Schofield v. Merrill, 435
N.E.2d 339, 340–45 (Mass. 1982) (holding that the owner of an abandoned quarry owed no duty
to an adult trespasser who suffered serious injury after he dove into a pit filled with water and
submerged rocks); Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So. 2d 152, 155, 158–60 (Miss. 2004) (affirming
summary judgment for defendants where drunk patron of a bar crawled through a small open
window onto an adjacent rooftop that he fell through); Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins., 637
A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I. 1994) (affirming summary judgment against the claims of two adult
motorcyclists who negligently collided while trespassing on the defendant’s undeveloped land:
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4. Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits
One could also view shareholder derivative actions as countenancing
a form of intrapersonal liability. Such litigation empowers some owners
to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a company in order to challenge the
wisdom of decisions made by those in control—namely, its directors and
officers.155 As one commentator explained: “While acknowledging a
corporation was a separate legal entity that normally was the proper party
to bring suit against its managers for mismanagement or fraud, courts
recognized that corporate managers controlled the corporation’s decision
to sue and were not likely to sue themselves.”156 Although managers
charged with misconduct would face personal liability, companies
typically purchase “D&O” insurance for their directors and officers to
cover most such judgments.157 Any damages recovered in a derivative
lawsuit would go to the corporation, which would benefit the successful
plaintiff shareholders only indirectly. In effect, this mechanism allows a
“Property owners have a basic right to be free from liability to those who engage in selfdestructive activity on their premises without permission.”); see also Blakely v. Camp Ondessonk,
38 F.3d 325, 327–29 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois law, though without citing Lee, and
affirming summary judgment for the operator of a large camping area where an intoxicated 17year-old trespasser suffered paralysis after falling down a cliff); Kirschner v. Louisville Gas &
Elec. Co., 743 S.W.2d 840, 844–45 (Ky. 1988) (affirming summary judgment for a defendant
where a 15-year-old boy got electrocuted after he climbed 66 feet up one of the utility’s towers
that carried high voltage lines).
155. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (adding that
shareholders also might use this mechanism to bring claims on behalf of the corporation against
third parties); Barrett v. S. Conn. Gas Co., 374 A.2d 1051, 1055 (Conn. 1977) (same); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder Derivative Suit,
50 GA. L. REV. 327, 341–87 (2016) (discussing the historical origins of this corporate
accountability mechanism and the difficulties involved in asserting such claims).
156. Ann M. Scarlett, Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical and Normative
Foundations, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 907 (2013); see also id. at 841, 888–95 (elaborating). As the
United States Supreme Court explained the procedure, “equity would hear and adjudge the
corporation’s cause through its stockholder with the corporation as a defendant, albeit a rather
nominal one.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); see also
Nejmanowski v. Nejmanowski, 841 F. Supp. 864, 865–66 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (“In a shareholder
derivative suit, the corporation is always initially named as a defendant . . . . The named plaintiff,
however, is only the nominal plaintiff. The corporation is the real party in interest. . . . Thus, in
most cases the corporation will be realigned as a plaintiff.”); Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret.
Sys., 74 A.3d 612, 617 (Del. 2013) (explaining that “the real plaintiff in a derivative suit is the
corporation”).
157. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991); id. at 84 (“[F]inancial penalties are virtually never imposed on
managers who are sued (settlements are paid by D&O insurance and firms do not adjust top
management’s compensation in response to lawsuits).”). See generally TOM BAKER & SEAN J.
GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [], Art. 4

684

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

corporation victimized by itself to secure a financial recovery from a
liability insurance policy that it had secured.158
To the extent that shareholder derivative claims offer a meaningful
parallel to intrapersonal liability, however, compensation plays a
diminished role relative to deterrence in this context.159 Indeed, it
becomes somewhat more difficult to map the model of such litigation on
to a genuinely intrapersonal injury claim: can the lungs or other organ
injured by the poor choices made by that individual’s brain assert a claim
on behalf of the integrated body against itself?160 Perhaps the analogy
improves if we imagine that the current managers of a corporation—
whether or not prompted by a demand lodged by shareholders—decide
to assert claims on behalf of the corporation against a group of former
officers and directors for misconduct that occurred while the latter acted
as its agents.
II. MY BAD: TENTATIVELY MAKING THE CASE FOR
INTRAPERSONAL LIABILITY
As revealed by the recurring references to principles of comparative
negligence, tort law already imposes a duty of self-care, but it does not
yet make breaches of that duty independently actionable. In contrast to
the previously discussed parental negligence lawsuits such as
Broadbent,161 recognizing an intrapersonal tort claim could not possibly
disrupt harmony, dissipate assets, provide the wrongdoer a windfall upon
the victim’s death, or interfere with a person’s exercise of discretion.
Although the prospect of such (“mea culpa”?) liability would hardly
discourage and might even encourage self-harming behaviors, incentives
for self-preservation should render the moral hazard concern presumably
less worrisome than in the intrafamily liability context. Allowing
individuals to sue themselves would, however, certainly magnify fears
158. See Dale A. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation’s Protection of Its Directors and Officers
from Personal Liability, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 513, 571 (discussing this “farcical triangle”).
159. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548 (“This remedy, born of stockholder helplessness, was long
the chief regulator of corporate management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least
grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders’ interests.”); Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., 546 A.2d 348,
351 (Del. 1988); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit:
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 302–08 (1981)
(explaining that deterrence has come to predominate over compensatory aims).
160. Cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 89–97 (2010) (adopting a “nerve center” test to
situate a corporation’s principal place of business when determining diversity of citizenship for
jurisdictional purposes); id. at 95 (“The metaphor of a corporate ‘brain,’ while not precise,
suggests a single location.”); Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87 TUL. L. REV.
457, 488–507 (2013) (elaborating on metaphorical references to the human body in the
construction of corporate personhood).
161. See supra notes 27–61 and accompanying text.
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about insurance fraud. Nonetheless, to the extent that compensatory goals
predominate, the case for intrapersonal liability seems at least as strong
as that for intrafamily liability or first-party negligent entrustment claims.
A. It’s About Time: Intertemporal Insights from Other Disciplines
At times, people make colloquial references to their “younger
selves,”162 and researchers have identified fundamental differences
between the earliest period of adulthood and later stages of life.163 Of
particular relevance to the present discussion, young adults engage in
hazardous behaviors more frequently than either adolescents or persons
over the age of twenty-four,164 which helps to explain the imposition of
higher age restrictions for access to certain dangerous products (e.g.,
alcohol and tobacco).165 Moreover, while we do not all necessarily reach
the same profound milestones or respond to them in the same way, sooner
or later most of us will encounter one or more fairly fundamental (positive
162. See, e.g., ELLYN SPRAGINS, WHAT I KNOW NOW: LETTERS TO MY YOUNGER SELF (2006)
(collecting dozens of such essays penned by leading women); see also Richard A. Posner, Are We
One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 24 &
n.5 (1997) (emphasizing “that ‘self’ is a different concept from ‘person’ and that the idea of
multiple selves inhabiting the same person either simultaneously or successively (or both) is not
inconsistent with the way we think and talk,” citing a play by Edward Albee that featured three
versions of the same adult at distinct ages). Similarly, consider the oft-heard lament that
someone’s spouse is not the same person whom they married. For a different cultural phenomenon
that relates to this broader discussion, consider the rise of “self-gifting” in lieu of the older
approach of getting a close family member something that you secretly want for yourself. See
Michelle Boorstein, To Thine Own Self: Gift, Too, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2012, at C1.
163. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category:
Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 644 (2016) (explaining
that “the research does suggest that young adults, like juveniles, are more prone to risk-taking and
that they act more impulsively than older adults”); id. (“The research on age patterns of risktaking, combined with the neuroscientific and psychological research on young adults, suggests
that the period of young adulthood can be understood as a transitional stage between adolescence
and mature adulthood.”); id. at 645–53 (elaborating).
164. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INVESTING IN THE HEALTH AND WELLBEING OF YOUNG ADULTS 203–13 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2015) (explaining that a spike in
morbidity and mortality occurs between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four from a variety of
preventable causes, including traffic accidents, unsafe sexual behaviors, violence, and substance
abuse). In some cases, however, the consequences of these risky behaviors may not become
manifest until many years later.
165. During the 1980s, Congress successfully pressured every state to adopt 21-years-of-age
as the minimum for consuming alcoholic beverages. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206–12 (1987) (holding that Congress enjoyed the power under the Spending Clause to impose
conditions on federal highway funds in order to encourage states to raise the drinking age); Laura
Hambleton, Experts Debate Merit of Making Drinking Age 21, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2010, at E5.
Recently, several states and localities have imposed a similar threshold for accessing tobacco
products. See Tripp Mickle & Alejandro Lazo, California Lifts Age for Cigarettes, WALL ST. J.,
May 5, 2016, at B2.
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or negative) emotional experiences.166 According to research undertaken
by psychologists, however, people routinely underestimate how much
their personalities, values, and preferences will continue to change
throughout their lifetimes.167 Similarly, behavioral economists have
documented “hyperbolic discounting,” which refers to the tendency to
disregard longer-term consequences.168 Lastly, philosophers have
struggled with questions about the fundamental nature of personal
identity over time.169
Even in a fairly mundane physiological sense, we differ from one
point in time to another. For instance, regular cell and tissue replacement
means that our bodies change constantly even if imperceptibly,170 though
166. See Avshalom Caspi & Brent W. Roberts, Personality Development Across the Life
Course: The Argument for Change and Continuity, 12 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 49, 51 (2001)
(“[E]vidence indicates that personality does not stop developing in childhood, adolescence, or
early adulthood. Rather, personality appears to grow increasingly consistent with age and to reach
a plateau later in life than originally thought (e.g., age 50).”); Norma Haan et al., As Time Goes
By: Change and Stability in Personality over Fifty Years, 1 PSYCHOL. & AGING 220, 230 (1986)
(“If personality is fluid, innovative, and adaptive, then it logically follows that changes should
occur when people confront definitive experiences of clear, unalterable consequence.”); see also
Steve M.J. Janssen et al., Why Does Life Appear to Speed up as People Get Older?, 22 TIME &
SOC’Y 274 (2013).
167. See Jordi Quoidbach et al., The End of History Illusion, 339 SCIENCE 96, 98 (2013); see
also Mathew A. Harris et al., Personality Stability from Age 14 to Age 77 Years, 31 PSYCHOL. &
AGING 862, 873 (2016) (“[P]ersonality changes only gradually throughout life, but by older age
it may be quite different from personality in childhood.”).
168. See George Ainslie & John Monterosso, Will as Intertemporal Bargaining:
Implications for Rationality, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 830–33 (2003); Richard H. McAdams,
Present Bias and Criminal Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1607, 1608 (“[T]ime inconsistency typically
pushes one to abandon long-term preferences in favor of immediate gratification.”); Daniel
Shaviro, Multiple Myopias, Multiple Selves, and the Under-Saving Problem, 47 CONN. L. REV.
1215, 1242–43, 1251–56 (2015); Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated TimeInconsistent Misconduct, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 612–14, 633–37 (2007); Stephanie Clifford, Why
Healthy Eaters Fall for Fries, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2013, at SR5.
169. For an accessible summary, see Identity over Time, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct.
6, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity–time/. For an analysis of some of the legal
implications of such insights, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self,
105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 965–68, 976 (1992) (discussing “the contingent self”); id. at 966 (“In
discussing the temporal dimension of the self, I distinguish between a momentary and a total self.
This distinction designates two ways of comprehending the self: one resembling the snapshot, the
other a motion picture . . . [or better yet] a single composite picture that incorporates all the
momentary selves.”); id. at 972 (“Responsibility, understood as a stance taken by the self,
implicates the distinction between the momentary and the total self.”); id. at 998–99 (using the
temporal dimension to explain the defense of duress).
170. See Olaf Bergmann et al., Evidence for Cardiomyocyte Renewal in Humans, 324
SCIENCE 98, 101 (2009) (finding that approximately half of heart muscle cells get replaced over a
normal life span); Nicholas Wade, Your Body Is Younger than You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2005, at F1 (“The entire human skeleton is thought to be replaced every 10 years or so in
adults . . . .”).
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you can hardly miss the accumulated effects of aging over longer
stretches of time.171 More dramatically, chronic disease, disability, and
major mental illness may cause fairly dramatic transformations in an
individual’s physical and emotional constitution, whether or not these
spring from a tortiously caused injury.172 Conversely, whether or not
prompted by efforts to mitigate such conditions, people nowadays can
choose from among a range of increasingly sophisticated enhancement
technologies, including prosthetic devices, biopharmaceutical agents, and
surgical interventions.173 In short, to a greater or lesser extent, the passage
of time changes everyone.
Given the inevitably of such changes, should courts recognize that
present victims stand apart (literally and figuratively) from their earlier
wrongdoing selves? Criminal law occasionally confronts an extreme
version of such questions when defendants claim that they should escape
responsibility for the unlawful actions of their former and different
selves: in rare cases, a serious condition such as a brain tumor may have
affected their decision-making;174 in other situations, a profound mental
illness such as dissociative identity disorder means that an alternate
personality displaced the host.175 Insofar as these sorts of discontinuities
in identity may at least partially excuse criminal misconduct, might tort

171. Moreover, an inability to detect such changes might signal an even more profound loss
of identity. See Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1601 (2006) (“Those with extreme memory
disorders, like advanced Alzheimer’s disease, may lack such memories and may lose a stable
sense of self. While memory is not the sole constituent of personal identity, it creates much of the
psychological continuity that makes us aware of our continuing existence over time.” (footnote
omitted)).
172. See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 241, 242–52, 264–87 (1999). Research on “hedonic adaption” cautions, however,
against overstating the consequences of physical and emotional setbacks. See Lars Noah,
Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering Damages, 42 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 431, 466–67 & n.149 (2009); cf. Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The
Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 537 (2011) (discussing “the
transformative nature of this adaptive process . . . that leads to a ‘changed person’”).
173. See LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 1287–89, 1315, 1318–
19 (4th ed. 2017); Lars Noah, Growing Organs in the Lab: Tissue Engineers Confront
Institutional “Immune” Responses, 55 JURIMETRICS 297, 301–09 (2015); Lars Noah, Turn the
Beat Around?: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1229,
1273–74 n.182 (2013).
174. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 169, at 990–91 (discussing Regina v. Charlson, 1 W.L.R.
317 (1955)).
175. See United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1016–18 (10th Cir. 1993). See
generally Symposium, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 10 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 179 (2001).
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law allow the present injured self to seek compensation from the
wrongdoing earlier self?176
B. Pragmatic Considerations and Insurance Countermeasures
To the extent that intertemporal shifts enhance the case for allowing
intrapersonal tort claims, this feature might present a variety of
difficulties. If the victim has become someone fundamentally different
with the passage of time, then so has the wrongdoer, posing questions
about the equity of penalizing the named defendant for tortious behavior
that may have occurred a long time ago. At a minimum, the standard of
care will have to relate back to the time of the injurious conduct, assuming
that statutes of limitation do not stand in the way: for harmful exposures
that occurred before adulthood, courts may apply a somewhat more
forgiving age-adjusted standard of care.177 In addition, as explained
below, comparative fault defenses will invariably limit if not altogether
bar recoveries for intrapersonal torts. More seriously, liability insurers
will respond as they have to the expanding availability of intrafamily torts
by attempting to exclude any such coverage.
Changes that occur over extended periods of time arguably render the
nominal defendant fundamentally different from the original tortfeasor,
but in other contexts that has never really served as grounds for
exculpation. For instance, in awarding punitive damages against a
corporation for decisions made decades earlier, courts endeavor to gauge
the reprehensibility of the tortious conduct against the standards that
prevailed at the time in question, but they have rejected suggestions that
the present instantiation of that continuing concern has changed so
fundamentally that the company should escape this form of
punishment.178 Similarly, courts have adopted rules of “successor”
liability, making corporations that acquire the assets of tortfeasors

176. Imagine, for example, a previously inoperable (or simply undetectable) brain tumor in
an adult that caused self-injurious behavior—upon successful treatment of the tumor, does the
individual have any basis for recourse against their cognitively impaired former self (assuming at
least that the prior impairment did not rise to such a level that even an injured third party would
have no recourse)?
177. See, e.g., Mastland, Inc. v. Evans Furniture, Inc., 498 N.W.2d 682, 684–85 (Iowa 1993);
Goss v. Allen, 360 A.2d 388, 390–91 (N.J. 1976) (holding that an age-adjusted standard would
apply to a 17-year-old who collided with the plaintiff while skiing); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 10(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2012);
Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 638–39
(2016).
178. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 475–76 (N.J. 1986) (discussing
these issues in an asbestos case that involved the passage of almost four decades between exposure
and litigation).
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financially responsible for those earlier misdeeds under an expanding set
of circumstances.179
Statutes of limitation could pose something of an obstacle.180 Of
course, a long-ago exposure that only triggers illness much later in life
would remain actionable under the discovery rule used for latent
diseases.181 Moreover, parties can waive this defense to the filing of tardy
claims,182 and the nominal defendants in intrapersonal liability cases
would have every reason to do so, though their liability insurers surely
would not tolerate a failure to interpose an available limitations objection.
Another affirmative defense might pose a more serious barrier to these
sorts of cases. By definition, the victim and culprit would have been
equally culpable for causing the injury. Under the old contributory
negligence rule or the modified versions of comparative negligence that
bar recovery unless the victim shared less responsibility than the
defendant(s),183 intrapersonal liability claims would invariably founder,
putting aside the possibility of waiver in the unlikely event that counsel
provided by the liability insurer neglects to raise the defense. In a clear
majority of jurisdictions, however, such claims would allow plaintiffs to
recoup exactly half of their damages. Even so, proximate causation
principles may cabin undue consideration of intertemporal changes,
disregarding factors too far removed in time or space as “remote” causes.
Insurance coverage limitations probably would pose the most
significant practical obstacle to the assertion of intrapersonal liability
claims. Apart from automobile policies, younger adults often do not carry

179. See, e.g., Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55–58 (Alaska 2001);
Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001); see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr. &
Christopher L. Frost, Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Redesign Ongoing, 72 BROOK.
L. REV. 1173, 1195–99, 1207–09 (2007) (summarizing and applauding this development); cf.
Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170, 1173–75 (N.Y. 2006) (declining to follow
the more expansive case law); Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 168 P.3d 814, 817 (Utah 2007) (same).
See generally John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371 (2011).
180. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Andrew
J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitation, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607,
609–18 (2008).
181. See, e.g., Griffin v. Garratt-Callahan Co., 74 F.3d 36, 38–39 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
New York’s statute); Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291, 293 (Ala. 2008); Pooshs v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 250 P.3d 181, 187 (Cal. 2011); see also Michael D. Green, The Paradox of
Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 976–79 (1988)
(discussing the widespread endorsement and adoption of this reform as well as some of the
interpretive difficulties that it posed).
182. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (“[T]he law
typically treats a limitations defense as an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise at the
pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver.”).
183. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
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liability insurance.184 If they reside at the home of their parents at the
relevant time (either while still minors or as dependent adults),185 then
homeowner insurance policies often come into play. Insurers have,
however, responded to the growing judicial recognition of intrafamily
claims by including coverage exclusions.186 Although occasionally struck
down as offending public policy,187 most courts enforce such
limitations.188 If drafted to exclude coverage of claims brought against an
insured by anyone in the household, then existing policies apparently
would not pay for intrapersonal liability claims; and, to the extent that
current policy exclusions suffer from any ambiguities, insurers will
quickly learn to make their unwillingness to cover such losses
unmistakable in the future.189
C. Does Compensation Alone Justify Expanding Tort Liability?
Viewed in isolation, each of the doctrinal developments canvassed in
Part I may seem more or less defensible. Although far from uniformly
adopted or unscathed by occasional criticism, almost no one
fundamentally objects to the demise of spousal and parental immunities
(though prenatal injury claims against mothers may provoke greater
objections), the decline of contributory negligence as a complete defense,
the growing unwillingness to enforce waivers of liability, the allowance
of negligent entrustment and dram shop liability (though perhaps less so
with first-party versions of these claims), the decline of status-based
184. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 664,
670–71 (2006) (explaining why homeowners routinely carry personal liability insurance while
typically younger renters do not).
185. See Tamar Lewin, Millennials’ No. 1 Roommates Are Their Parents, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 2016, at A3.
186. See Ashdown, supra note 57, at 254–55.
187. See, e.g., Lewis ex rel. Lewis v. W. Am. Ins., 927 S.W.2d 829, 832–36 (Ky. 1996)
(holding that a family member exclusion in an automobile liability policy offended public policy
even though it applied only to coverage amounts that exceeded the statutory minimum); cf.
Reserve Ins. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764, 769–70 (Cal. 1982) (narrowly construing the “family”
exclusion in a policy as not encompassing a stepson).
188. See Principal Cas. Ins. v. Blair, 500 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa 1993) (collecting cases);
Vierkant ex rel. Johnson v. AMCO Ins., 543 N.W.2d 117, 120–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Allen
v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 798, 804–07 (Utah 1992) (holding that a household
exclusion in a homeowner’s liability policy relieved the insurer of any obligation to cover a
negligence claim brought by a 2-year-old child against his mother after she spilled boiling water
on him); Rich v. Allstate Ins., 445 S.E.2d 249, 251–53 (W. Va. 1994); Shannon v. Shannon, 442
N.W.2d 25, 35 (Wis. 1989); see also Purkey v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 173 S.W.3d 703, 706–
09 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that a family exclusion in an automobile liability policy did not offend
public policy).
189. In the absence of insurance coverage, a young adult might try this maneuver in order to
get early access to a trust fund.
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distinctions in defining landowner duties to entrants (apart from arguable
obligations running even to trespassers), or the use of shareholder
derivative actions. Viewed in the aggregate, however, the nature of each
of these seemingly justifiable doctrinal choices suggests a broader and
perhaps more controversial expansionist tendency in American tort law.
The prospect of intrapersonal liability, premised on plausible extensions
of these various developments, serves to illustrate the nature of that
phenomenon more starkly.
At first blush, intrapersonal liability sounds like a ridiculous idea.
Creative personal injury lawyers have, however, regularly managed to
press what seem like equally counterintuitive claims,190 though some
commentators discern incrementalism as opposed to genuine novelty in
this field.191 Civil recourse and corrective justice theorists undoubtedly
would scoff at the suggestion,192 even though the latter group may aspire

190. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a
Competitor’s Copycat Product, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 673, 684–95 (2010) (criticizing
the use of negligent misrepresentation claims against brand-name product manufacturers when
consumers suffer injuries from generic versions sold by companies that do not offer as desirable
a litigation target, and contrasting it with the slightly less radical market-share liability theory);
Noah, supra note 82, at 370–78, 403–04 (discussing loss-of-a-chance recoveries in medical
malpractice cases); Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard
and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 364–79 (2002) (tracing expansions in duties
of disclosure owed by physicians to their patients); Lars Noah, Platitudes About “Product
Stewardship” in Torts: Continuing Drug Research and Education, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 359, 365–66 & n.28 (2009) (noting the advent of recoveries for “medical monitoring”
expenses); see also id. at 366–80 (questioning “product stewardship” and “informed choice”
proposals for pharmaceutical cases); cf. id. at 385–91 (advocating instead an extension of
negligent marketing claims).
191. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539,
1540–41, 1544 (1997) (counting only four brand-new torts that succeeded in the 20th century);
see also Anita Bernstein, The New-Tort Centrifuge, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 414–15 (1999)
(recognizing some objections to the excessively narrow focus of her earlier essay); Robert F.
Blomquist, “New Torts”: A Critical History, Taxonomy, and Appraisal, 95 DICK. L. REV. 23, 82
& n.434, 128–29 (1990) (offering a broader list, and commenting on the different meanings of
this concept); Kyle Graham, The Diffusion of Doctrinal Innovations in Tort Law, 99 MARQ. L.
REV. 75, 93–98 (2015) (same); id. at 97 (“In all, this analysis considers the diffusion of more than
thirty innovations in tort law—far from a complete recitation of the broad changes that have
occurred in this field, but a respectable sample nevertheless.”).
192. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 918 & n.7, 945–46, 972–73 (2010) (emphasizing the relational aspects of tort law, and
drawing contrasts with the loss-allocational theories that have come to predominate); id. at 929
(“[A]n obsession with accidents prompted mid-twentieth-century jurists to emphasize tort law’s
potential as a source of compensation while deemphasizing its foundation in a notion of
wrongs.”); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 351
(2002) (“Corrective justice links two parties and no more because a relationship of correlativity
is necessarily bipolar.”); see also Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where
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to figuratively go back in time in order to undo a harm,193 and those
scholars preoccupied with deterrence goals would see absolutely no value
in recognizing intrapersonal liability.194 In contrast, the more numerous
courts and commentators who rush to applaud the predominantly
compensatory function of tort law195 presumably would at least
grudgingly—if not wholeheartedly—endorse the idea. Perhaps this
exercise will throw some much needed cold water on enthusiastic
members of that latter camp.
CONCLUSION
More than two decades of regularly teaching Torts has left me
profoundly cynical about the entire enterprise. Consider this long-ago
lament from one prominent scholar: “When I was in law school twenty
years ago, we used to joke that the purpose of the first year torts class was
to teach us why the widows and orphans could not always win. That
lesson may be less frequent today.”196 To my mind, things have only
gotten worse in the intervening quarter of a century. The drive to find a
handy pot of money for victims has marginalized the need to identify
Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 673–74 (1995) (objecting to the
“protect me from myself” cases).
193. See Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 107, 117 (2011) (part of a symposium on this broader subject); see also id. at 118–28
(arguing that, properly understood, corrective justice aims to allow adversaries to “get even”
rather than to undo the damage that one has done to another).
194. See generally Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181 (2012).
195. See Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in
Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick
Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137, 139 (1999) (“We argue compensation is not only a plausible goal
of the tort system, it is a desirable—and indeed an essential—goal.”); id. at 145 (“To the extent
scholars attempt to create mixed theories of tort law, they should focus not only on deterrence and
corrective justice but on compensation in more than just its instrumental role in helping to
implement the other two.”); id. at 152–54 (elaborating); cf. Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory
Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2162 (2000)
(explaining that, under “a form of strict products liability that takes questions about defectiveness
out of the equation . . . , enterprises would know that they must pay for any product-related injuries
to consumers, no matter . . . the social disutilities of the price increases that would have to
accompany such a regime of compulsory insurance”); Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability
Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 851–52 & n.47, 907–09 & n.302 (2009)
(criticizing commentators who advocate on purely compensatory grounds a duty to warn about or
design against even “unknowable” risks). The case law highlighted in Part I of this Article
invariably emphasized the compensatory purposes of tort law.
196. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Defenses/Enforcing Standards: The Next Stage of the
Tort Revolution?, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069, 1075 n.19 (1991); see also Noah, supra note 79, at
1656 n.210 (“I have never fully understood this apparently widespread assumption that outcomes
favoring defendants are somehow inherently more suspect.”). See generally Victor E. Schwartz
et al., Deep Pocket Jurisprudence: Where Tort Law Should Draw the Line, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 359
(2018).
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genuine culprits. Indeed, I find it mildly alarming that one can craft a
remotely plausible case for recognition of intrapersonal liability.
Welcome to my waking nightmare.
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